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ABSTRACT
Since the enactment of the new Anti-corruption Law, the interaction be-
tween the antitrust and anti-corruption leniency regimes has attracted the
attention of policy makers. More recently, the emergence of Operation Car
Wash ("operagdo lava jato"), one of the biggest corruption scandals of all
time, has established a need to more closely analyze the criminal leniency
regime under the Criminal Organization Law. Following an introduction,
section two of this paper summarizes the recent history of the cooperation
between different authorities involved in cartel enforcement. Section three
further explores the roles and features of the main authorities discussed in
this paper. Section four addresses administrative antitrust, administrative
anti-corruption, and criminal infringements related to bid rigging practices.
Likewise, section five addresses the main administrative antitrust, adminis-
trative and judicial anti-corruption, and criminal penalties that can be im-
posed by administrative and judicial authorities prosecuting a bid rigging
practice. Section six addresses the most significant challenges brought by
the interface between administrative antitrust, administrative anti-corrup-
tion, and criminal legislation: the issues related to the enforcement of the
leniency agreements. The conclusion reinforces the importance of the anti-
trust, anti-corruption, and criminal authorities working together to reach
the best practices that could lead to an optimum enforcement of the three
leniency regimes.
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I. INTRODUCTIONB Y examining the interface between the Antitrust Law (Law
12,529 of 2011), the Anti-Corruption Law (Law 12,846 of 2013),
and the Organized Crime Law (Law 12,850 of 2013), this paper
aims to compare three legal regimes: the administrative antitrust, anti-
corruption, and the criminal leniency agreements, and to identify the sim-
ilarities and the main conflicting provisions that create enforcement chal-
lenges for such regimes.
Since the enactment of the new Anti-Corruption Law that was, to a
significant extent, inspired by the Antitrust Law, the interaction between
the antitrust and the anti-corruption leniency regimes has attracted the
attention of policy makers. A good example of such policy concern can
be seen in the following extract of a book edited by the antitrust agency's
leading officials:
[T]he new Anti-corruption Law ... completes the Brazilian competi-
tion legal framework and will work hand-in-hand with the latter, for
instance, in cartel cases . . .. A reciprocal fertilization exists between
these two fields but their effective dialogue for efficient and practical
results depends on the techniques used to build a common
language.
More recently, the emergence of Operation Car Wash (operagdo lava
jato) as one of the biggest corruption scandals of all time has called atten-
tion to the interface between the antitrust and anti-corruption leniency
regimes.2 Importantly, the scandal brought attention to the criminal leni-
ency regime of the Criminal Organization Law.3 This is evidenced by the
fact that the Federal Public Prosecution Office (MPF) and the Adminis-
trative Council for Economic Defense (CADE), an antitrust agency, have
focused on the interaction between the three leniency regimes.4 A fed-
eral prosecutor in a CADE/MPF joint event presented the following
chart:5
1. Nitish Monebhurrun, Fighting Corruption and Promoting Competition in Brazil, in
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AND COMPETITION ENF ORCEM ENT: BRAZILIAN
AND EUROPEAN EXPERIENCES FROM THE ENFORCERS' PERiSPIEicivEs 81-90, 82
(Vinicius Marques de Carvalho et al. eds., 2014).
2. See Brian Nicholson, 'Brazil's Operation Car Wash', INT'i BAR Ass'N. (Apr. 8,
2015), http://www.ibanet.org/Article/Detail.aspx?ArticleUid=7960b146-65c4-4fc2-
bb6a-c6fbb434cdl6 (visited Dec. 13, 2015).
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Rodrigo de Grandis, Prosecutor of the Anti-Cartel Group of the Federal Public
Prosecution Office in Sao Paulo, Presentation at the Federal Public Prosecution
Office's seminar on the interface between the antitrust leniency program and the
Anti-corruption Law leniency (June 29, 2015).
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6. Lei No. 12.529, de 30 de Novembro de 2011, DiAiuo OFICIAL DA UNIAO [D.O.U.]
de 01.12.2011 (Braz.).
7. Lei No. 12.846, de 1 de Agosto de 2013, DIARIO OFICIAL DA UNIAO [D.O.U.] de
02.08.2013 (Braz.).
8. Lei No. 12.850, de 2 de Agosto de 2013, DIARIO OFICIAL DA UNIAO [D.O.U.] de
05.08.2013 (Braz.).
9. Lei No. 12.529, de 30 de Novembro de 2011, DIARIO OFICIAL DA UNIAO [D.O.U.]
de 01.12.2011 (Braz.).
10. The Office of the Comptroller General (GCU) is the signatory authority according
to the law when the corrupt practice may have harmed a federal government body.
The authority is different when the practice harms state and local government
bodies. In the latter cases, the signatory authority is defined by state and local
regulations of the Anti-Corruption Law 12,846 of 2013. Lei No. 12.846, de 1 de
Agosto de 2013, DIARIO OFICIAL DA UNIAO [D.O.U.] de 02.08.2013 (Braz.).
11. Lei No. 12.850, de 2 de Agosto de 2013, art. 4, DIARIO OFICIAL DA UNIAO
[D.O.U.] de 05.08.2013 (Braz.).
12. Lei No. 12.529, de 30 de Novembro de 2011, art. 86, DiAiuo OFICIAL DA UNIAO
[D.O.U.] de 01.12.2011 (Braz.).
13. Lei No. 12.846, de 1 de Agosto de 2013, art. 16, DIArio OFICIAL DA UNIAO
[D.O.U.] de 02.08.2013 (Braz.).
14. Lei No. 12.850, de 2 de Agosto de 2013, art. 4, DIARIO OFICIAL DA UNIAO
[D.O.U.] de 05.08.2013 (Braz.).
15. Lei No. 12.529, de 30 de Novembro de 2011, art. 31, DiARio OFICIAL DA UNIAO
[D.O.U.] de 01.12.2011 (Braz.).
16. Lei No. 12.846, de 1 de Agosto de 2013, art. 16, DIARIO OFICIAL DA UNIAO
[D.O.U.] de 02.08.2013 (Braz.).
17. Lei No. 12.850, de 2 de Agosto de 2013, art. 1, DIARo OFICIAL DA UNIAO
[D.O.U.] de 05.08.2013 (Braz.).
Administrative antitrust Administrative anti-
leniency corruption leniency Criminal leniency
Law 12,529 of 2011.6 Law 12,846 of 2013.7 Law 12,850 of 2013.8
Signatory authority according to the law
CADE's General Office of the Comptroller Police Chief Investigator
Superintendence 9  General (CGU)1 0  or Public Prosecution
Officen1
Applicant
The 1st legal entity The first legal entity1 3  No 1st one requirement1 4
or Note:
individuals (no 1st one However, only the 1st one
requirement)1 2  can obtain full immunity
Beneficiary
Legal entities and Legal entities only' 6  Individuals only' 7
individuals15
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Administrative (legal
entities and individuals)




1/3 to 2/3 fine reduction





Full immunity in respect
to:
Law 8,137 of 1990 (cartel
as a criminal offense) 2 1
Law 8,666 of 1993 (bid
rigging as a criminal
offense) 2 2






Up to 2/3 fine reduction
+
Immunity from the penalty
of prohibition of receiving
incentives, subsidies,
grants, donations or loans
from the government 2 0
The chart above suggests there are inconsistencies between the three
legal regimes. As anticipated, when there is a cartel-more specifically, a
bid rigging-all these regimes may become applicable.
In crimes involving a cartel violation, the offenders have the choice of
seeking a leniency agreement, but they also have the choice of defending
themselves until the end of an administrative and/or criminal proceeding
without considering applying for leniency.24 Several offenders, indeed,
consider such a possibility. But, they do not know where to start their
application or whether they should apply for all regimes.
It is clear that each type of leniency agreement incentivizes offenders
to provide information to the authority-information that may be highly
useful in order to uncover possible infringement crimes and prosecute
other offenders.2 5 Thus, the underlying policy reason of such legal re-









Lei No. 12.529, de 30 de Novembro de 2011, art. 86 § 4(I), DiAmo OFICIAL IDA
UNIAo [D.O.U.] de 01.12.2011 (Braz.).
Id. at art. 86, §4(11).
Lei No. 8.137, de 27 de Dezembro de 1990, DIARIO OFICIAL UNIAO [D.O.U.] de
28.12.1990 (Braz.).
Lei No. 8.666, de 21 de Junho de 1993, DiAiRio OFICIAL DA UNIAO [D.O.U.] de
06.07.1994 (Braz.).
Lei No. 12.846, de 1 de Agosto de 2013, DiARIo OFICIAL DA UNIAO [D.O.U.] de
02.08.2013 (Braz.).
Lei No. 12.850, de 2 de Agosto de 2013, art. 4, DiAiuo OFICIAL DA UNIAO
[D.O.U.] de 05.08.2013 (Braz.).
See Grandis, supra note 5.
SECRETARIAT OF ECONOMIC LAW ET AL., FIGHTING CARTELS: BRAZIL's LENI-
ENCY PROGRAM 17 (3d ed. 2009), available at http://www.cade.gov.br/acesso-a-in-
Criminal (individuals)
Full immunity (only the 1st
one)
Or





But by comparing such incentives, it is evident they do not align ex-
actly. That is, it is difficult to lead the execution on the regime in accor-
dance with the three different kinds of agreements. This may lead the
authorities involved in each kind of prosecution to different positions in
terms of the level of evidence presented, which ultimately leads to differ-
ent holdings regarding the same violation.26
Given some limitations on information shared between the authorities,
the different level of evidence possessed by each one could undermine
the possibility of full enforcement of the two administrative legislations
(antitrust and anti-corruption), as well as the criminal one (therefore de-
creasing deterrence). 2 7 In the worst scenario, this could also interrupt the
cooperation between the authorities, as authorities would be competing
between themselves with the aim of guaranteeing full enforcement of
their own jurisdictions.
Before addressing the leniency agreements, in order to make this paper
accessible to a public wider than antitrust and anti-corruption specialists,
the next section addresses the recent history between the different au-
thorities involved in cartel enforcement, including antitrust law enforce-
ment, criminal prosecutors, police, the Office of the Comptroller General
(CGU), an anti-corruption agency, and the Federal Court of Auditors
(TCU). In this context, the use of deterrence tools and measures adopted
to enhance the fight against bid rigging will also be addressed.
II. AUTHORITY'S COOPERATION
A. LEGAL COOPERATION AND COOPERATION AGREEMENTS
In terms of cooperation amongst authorities, there seem to be two
kinds of cooperation: (i) legal cooperation, when cooperation or interac-
tion is imposed or established in the laws that regulate the powers of the
agencies; and (ii) cooperation agreements, when cooperation is estab-
lished by the agencies through agreements. 28
There is legal cooperation between the antitrust authority, criminal
prosecutors, and the police in order to request judicial authorization and
to conduct dawn raids. Legal cooperation can be enhanced through co-
operation agreements, and such was the case with these authorities. A
cooperation agreement, for instance, is the one executed between CADE
and the CGU, as detailed below. 2 9
form acao/publicacoes-institucionais/documentos-da-antiga-lei/
brazil leniencia-program-brochure.pdf.
26. Marcelo Calliari & Denis Alves Guimaraes, Brazilian Cartel Enforcement: From
Revolution to the Challenges of Consolidation, 25 ANTITRUST 67, 68 (2011).
27. See id. at 67.
28. See Marcio de Oliveria Junior, Brazil: Administrative Council for Economic De-
fence, GRCI (Aug. 30, 2016), http://globalcompetitionreview.com/chapter/1068704/
brazil-administrative-council-for-economic-defence
29. Acordo de cooperagio no. 02.2014, de 22 de Janeiro de 2014, DIARIO OFICIAL DA
UNIAo [D.O.U.] de 06.02.2014 (Braz.).
2016] - 199
200 LAW AND BUSINESS REVIEW OF THE AMERICAS [Vol. 22
B. DETERRENCE TOOLS
In 2000, the Brazilian antitrust authority "started to use more aggres-
sive means of investigating cartels," including dawn raids and wiretap-
ping, as well as leniency agreements.3 0 "Nevertheless, [adopting] new
tools, such as dawn raids, in a system that had not been used [before]
was... far from trivial." 31 "First, dawn raids have to be authorized by the
courts," and then the antitrust authority has to gather-in the file of the
investigations-"enough. . .evidence to convince judges that such an ag-
gressive measure" was in fact necessary.32 In cases in which "there was
an absence of, or scarce documentary evidence," the authority "had to
rely on witness statements." 33
"Once the warrant has been issued, the practical part of the task has to
be faced." 34 "To conduct dawn raids [the antitrust authority] also had to
establish cooperation with criminal prosecutors and with the police." 35
This was difficult because cooperation between a government agency, the
public prosecution, and the police, with the aim of deterring cartels, was
entirely new to the authorities. 36
"Whistleblowers have been an important source of information"
through which CADE is becoming aware of cartel activities.3 7 CADE's
extensive effort to spread information "on its work of cartel enforcement
... progressively increased the number of reports."38
C. Focus ON BID RIGGING
"Bid rigging, perceived as a particularly prevalent type of antitrust vio-
lation in Brazil and a particularly pernicious one in terms of its negative
impact on society, [has] received special attention." 39 In 2008, a govern-
ment agency was responsible for conducting antitrust investigations. 40
The Secretariat of Economic Law of the Ministry of Justice (SDE) "is-
sued a booklet called 'Fighting Bid-rigging,' 41 and in 2009, issued guide-
lines on analyzing possible" anticompetitive arrangements in bid rigging
agreements (SDE Ordinance n. 51 of July 3, 2009).42 Also, it seemed like
the cooperation between the antitrust authority, the public prosecution,
and the police was not sufficient to properly fight bid rigging. 43
30. Marcelo Calliari & Denis Alves Guimaries, Brazil: Toward a Mature Cartel En-
forcement Jurisdiction?, in COMPETITION LAW IN THE BRICS COUNTRIES 19
(Adrian Emch et al. eds., 2012).
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Calliari & Guimaraes, supra note 26, at 68.
34. Calliari & Guimaraes, supra note 30.
35. Calliari & Guimaraes, supra note 26, at 68.
36. Calliari & Guimaraes, supra note 30, at 20.
37. Id.
38. Id.






"In 2010, the federal government decided that a broader initiative," the
National Strategy of Anti-Corruption and Money Laundry (ENCCLA),
which involved "approximately eighty different authorities from around
the country, would focus on this issue," including CGU and TCU.4 4
"This joint group. . .was charged with" analyzing and proposing solutions
to the risks of violations in biddings and contracts of public works. 4 5
In the same book edited by CADE's leading officials quoted above,
Monebhurrun addressed the institutional cooperation between CADE
and CGU:
The cooperation indeed aims at fighting any form of active or passive
corruption in public procurement in order to allocate the State's
scarce resources towards productive ends. . .. Such acts of corruption
whereby one private entity obtains illegal advantages or privileges in
exchange of money transferred or payments of any other nature
made to the public administration are not isolated ones and require a
tentacular institutional intervention. The scourge is a national one
and does not only pertain to the micro level; but also for this reason,
the question is of a Federal nature and importance -, and depends on
the active participation of Federal organs.
The cooperation agreement therefore provides for the creation and
adoption of specific and tailored mechanisms and techniques to
strengthen the dialogue between the anti-corruption authority (The
Comptroller General) and the Competition Authority which are ex-
pected to act preventively and repressively. . ..
Mutual education is what is expected from the concerned authorities
in their anti-corruption and competition promotion task. ...
Consequently, the Competition Authority is expected to transfer any
relevant information on potential fraudulent activities obtained dur-
ing its administrative procedures to the Secretary for the Prevention
of Corruption and for Strategic Information of the Comptroller Gen-
eral's office; the Secretary must accordingly reciprocate when it is
made aware of useful data on competition and corruption. In a simi-
lar logic, both authorities have accepted to offer technical assistance
to each other and to provide technical advice in given cases which
are of their potential mutual interest. They can, for such purposes,
require that an expert from the other authority be present during
specific audiences. Both authorities can also decide to set up joint
working groups . . . in order to investigate violations. . ..46
Therefore, it is evident that CADE's role is to coordinate with CGU
when facing bid-rigging cases that, apart from an alleged antitrust viola-
tion, may also include an anti-corruption violation. This was publicly
stated by CADE's President in his interview during the 63rd Antitrust
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Monebhurrun, supra note 1, at 86.
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Law Spring Meeting on April 17, 2015, in Washington D.C.4 7
Cooperation with the criminal authorities, such as public prosecutors, is
much more advanced than in the anti-corruption agency.48 Nevertheless,
the anti-corruption agency is also evolving, which can be seen with the
attention received from private sector specialists. 4 9
III. AUTHORITIES
A. PUBLIC PROSECUTION OFFICE AND CARTEL ENFORCEMENT
"Perhaps one of the most visible results of [CADE's] initiatives has
been the growing . .. involvement of the public prosecutors [concerning]
cartel matters."5 0 In spite of that, it is clear the initiatives face huge
challenges:
[A]s the public prosecutors become aware of the importance of fight-
ing cartels and have already started to do it ... an enormous field for
their continuous work is now open. The reason for this is that no
matter how much the . . . government will be willing to invest in
cartel enforcement from the administrative point of view, these re-
sources will never get close to the magnitude of the ones available to
the public prosecutors for criminal cartel enforcement.5 1
It is evident that the vast structure of public prosecution (especially the
federal structure, which is much better equipped than the state prosecu-
tors' offices, whose sizes and resources vary between different states) is
devoted to fight several criminal and civil violations besides the competi-
tion crimes. Consequently, its continuing level of priority to cartels is
linked to the future relationship between public prosecutors and CADE,
CGU, and TCU, especially in light of the developments of the Operation
Car Wash, in which all these institutions play an important role.5 2 Never-
theless, "the fact is that a huge field for cartel criminal enforcement is
already open, and given that public prosecutors are able to launch crimi-
nal investigations throughout the whole country independently from"
CADE's General Superintendence (SG)- CADE's investigative
branch- the results of this growing activity are "widely uncertain" and
can be conducted "without a specialized antitrust authority to assist with
the investigation." 53
Cartel criminal enforcement can benefit from the Public Prosecution
Office's independence, which can allow them to prosecute "offenders
linked to strong political, economic, and social agents; "public prosecu-
47. See IBRAC Eventos, Painel 1 - 21.o Semindrio Internacional de Defesa da Concor-




50. Calliari & Guimaraes, supra note 30, at 21; Calliari & Guimaraes, supra note 26, at
68.
51. Calliari & Guimaraes, supra note 30, at 21.
52. See id.
53. Calliari & Guimaraes, supra note 26, at 68.
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tors are experienced in fighting corruption and white collar crimes, [viola-
tions] that are similar. . .to cartels." 54
"It is certainly true that public prosecutors" deliver a great contribu-
tion "to both criminal and administrative cartel enforcement by" taking
antitrust enforcement to parts of the country and to a number of cases in
which the antitrust agencies cannot perform on their own.5 5 But in the
scenario of a widespread decentralized cartel criminal enforcement
throughout Brazil, the importance that a specialized antitrust body can
coordinate all this work should not be underestimated. 56
The Anti-Cartel Group of the Federal Public Prosecution Office in Sao
Paulo (the state branch of a federal body) and GEDEC, which belongs to
the State of Sao Paulo Public Prosecution Office (a state body), are two
of the public prosecution's specialized groups.5 7 Both "have been sup-
porting [SG] in the negotiation of leniency agreements and [assuring] that
the individuals who executed the agreements will not be subject to crimi-
nal cartel investigations (which could only be launched by public prosecu-
tors)." 58 These groups have developed in a very positive way; for
example, the groups use competition law specialists within the very large
structure of public prosecution offices, which leads "to a greater accumu-
lation of knowledge and experience in the area and more efficient train-
ing of [the relevant] staff." 59
B. THE ADMINISTRATIVE AUTHORITIES:
ANTITRUST AND ANTI-CORRUPTION
Cartel administrative enforcement is entirely performed by CADE,
which is comprised of the investigative branch, the SG, and the Tribu-
nal.6 0 CADE is an independent agency because both investigation and
decision processes are made by independent authorities. For example,
the officials must be appointed by the President of the Republic and ap-
proved by the Senate for a given term: four years for the Commissioners
of the Tribunal and two years for the SG-the latter can be appointed to
a second term. 61 They cannot be removed from office by a Presidential
order-this would only happen in the case of resignation or misconduct
proven in the scope of an administrative proceeding. 62 Such indepen-
dency assures a significant level of protection against political
interference.






60. See SECRETARIAT OF ECONOMic LAW ET AL., FIGHTING CARTELS: BRAZIL'S LENI-
ENCY PROGRAM, supra note 25, at 5.
61. Lei No. 12.529, de 30 de Novembro de 2011, art. 6, DIARIO OFICIAL DA UNIAO
[D.O.U.] de 01.12.2011 (Braz.).
62. Id.
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Monebhurrun made a broad assessment on the institutional structure
related to the enforcement of the Anti-Corruption Law:
The Brazilian Competition Authority does not, in itself, have juris-
diction for corruption matters. This is institutionally normal: a com-
petition authority is specialized in competition questions and is
expected to deliver learned opinions within this ambit.
Corruption and anti-corruption issues fall under the competence of
other public bodies, the main ones being the Comptroller General
(Controladoria Geral da Unido - CGU), the Federal Court of Audi-
tors (Tribunal de Contas da Uniio - TCU), and the . .. national and
federal Public Prosecutors; the Ministry of Planning is also engaged
in combating corruption.
The Comptroller General controls and audits the expenses of the
Federal Executive; it acts as the Brazilian anti-corruption agency.
The Federal Court of Auditors is responsible for the auditing of the
public administration's accounts; it supervises the public treasury.
The Ministry of Planning organizes the information technology sys-
tem for public procurement and have, accordingly, developed
software tools to better detect potential shades of corruption acts
during public bidding processes.63
In spite of the existence of this broad scenario, in the administrative
scope, CGU is similar to CADE because the former is the highest federal
administrative authority with the power to investigate and convict admin-
istrative infringements stated by the Anti-Corruption Law and the only
one at the federal level with the power to execute leniency agreements. 64
But unlike the Antitrust Law, the Anti-Corruption Law did not create an
independent institutional structure to enforce its provisions; that is, the
CGU Minister is directly subordinated to the President of the Republic
and can be freely appointed and removed from office at any time.6 5 Evi-
dently, such institutional structure faces a significant risk of political
interference.
Administrative Cartel Enforcement Structure
Law 12,529 of 2011 (after May 2012)66
CADE
SG ..,..... Tribunal
Independent investigalive body Independent decision making
63. Monebhurrun, supra note 1, at 84.
64. See id.
65. See id.
66. See Lei No. 12.529, de 30 de Novembro de 2011, DIARIO OFICIAL DA UNIAO
[D.O.U.] de 01.12.2011 (Braz.).
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Administrative Anti-Corruption Enforcement Structure




Political invcstigative (ad hoc) Political decision maker
Thus, the figures above represent the whole structure of CADE and
CGU and the main bodies in charge of investigating and deciding the
cases-the former is mainly comprised by the independent bodies SG (in-
vestigation) and Tribunal (decision),69 while the latter (in what concerns
the Anti-Corruption Law enforcement) is formed by an investigative ad
hoc commission appointed by the CGU Minister, with the CGU Minister
himself acting as decision maker.7 0 Therefore, in the case of CGU, the
figure indicates that both the Commission and the Minister act as political
investigators and decision makers, respectively.
Notably, the Anti-Corruption Law itself does not state the creation of a
commission to conduct the investigation to be decided by the CGU Min-
ister-it was established by the Regulating Presidential Decree 8,420 of
2015.71 Such commissions should be created not only when (i) the in-
fringement is investigated by the highest federal administrative authority
regarding the enforcement of the Anti-Corruption Law (CGU), but also
when (ii) the federal administrative authority conducting the investiga-
tion is another Ministry, or (iii) the authority is the head of a body not
subordinated to any Ministry-this would be the case of independent
agencies, such as CADE. 72
In fact, the Anti-Corruption Law sets the second and third conditions
as the general rules because the law is enforceable by any public body
possibly harmed by acts of corruption.73 But the first condition is very
important because CGU has (a) concurrent power to launch investiga-
tions on acts of corruption possibly carried out against anybody of the
Federal Executive (Article 8, section 2 of the law); (b) exclusive power to
request that an investigation being conducted by another federal body is
67. Lei No. 12.846, de 1 de Agosto de 2013, arts. 6 & 20, DIARIO OFICIAL DA UNIAO
[D.O.U.] de 02.08.2013 (Braz.).
68. See Decreto No. 8.420, de 18 de Margo de 2015, DIARo OFICIAL 1)A UNIAo
[D.O.U.] de 19.03.2015 (Braz.).
69. See Lei No. 12.529, de 30 de Novembro de 2011, art. 13, DIARIO OFICIAL DA
UNIAO [D.O.U.] de 01.12.2011 (Braz.).
70. See Lei No. 12.846, de 1 de Agosto de 2013, art. 8, DIARIO OFICIAL DA UNIAO
[D.O.U.] de 02.08.2013 (Braz.).
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withdrawn from such body and sent to its own analysis for review (Article
8, section 2 of the law); and (c) exclusive power to investigate acts of
corruption that may have harmed a foreign public administration (Article
9 of the law). 7 4
Thus, there is no doubt that CGU is the most important body responsi-
ble for enforcing the Anti-Corruption Law. Besides the powers described
above, as a Brazilian anti-corruption agency, CGU has several powers
that are not related to the enforcement of the Anti-Corruption Law
12,846 of 2013. Rather, these powers are related to the enforcement of
other laws, which directly or indirectly involve the prevention against acts
of corruption.7 5 CGU also has the power to execute the leniency agree-
ments established in Law 12,846 of 2013.76
IV. INFRINGEMENTS
As discussed in the introduction of this paper, bid rigging is an antitrust
violation that can frequently occur in combination with the payment of
bribes to a public official in exchange for some facilitation of the
collusion.
In fact, Law 12,846 of 2013 also defines bid rigging as an anti-corrup-
tion offense regardless of the presence of bribes; that is, payment of
bribes constitutes a different infringement.7 7
The chart below compares provisions of the Antitrust, the Anti-Cor-
ruption, and Criminal laws. The chart will show that these statutes have
very similar definitions regarding the fields of violations. The concurrent
prohibitions are under Article 36, Section 3 of Law 12,529 of 2011; Article
5, Section 4 of Law 12,846 of 2013; Article 4, Sections 1 and 2 of the
Criminal Law; and Articles 90 and 288 of the Criminal Law.
Bid rigging as antitrust, anti-corruption, and criminal offense:
74. Id.
75. See id.
76. Lei No. 12.846, de 1 de Agosto de 2013, art. 5(IV), DiAuo OFICIAL DA UNIAO
[D.O.U.] de 02.08.2013 (Braz.).
77. Id.
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See Lei No. 12.529, de 30 de Novembro de 2011, DIARIO OFICIAL DA UNIAO
[D.O.U.] de 01.12.2011 (Braz.).
See Lei No. 12.846, de 1 de Agosto de 2013, DIARIO OFICIAL DA UNIAO [D.O.U.]
de 02.08.2013 (Braz.).
Lei No. 12.529, de 30 de Novembro de 2011, art. 36 § 3, DIARIO OFICIAL DA
UNAO [D.O.U.] de 01.12.2011 (Braz.).
Lei No. 12.846, de 1 de Agosto de 2013, art. 1, DIARIO OFICIAL DA UNIAO
[D.O.U.] de 02.08.2013 (Braz.).
Lei No. 8.137, de 27 de Dezembro de 1990, art. 4, DIARIO OFICIAL UNIAO
[D.O.U.] de 28.12.1990 (Braz.).
Lei No. 8.666, de 21 de Junho de 1993, art. 90, DIARIO OFICIAL DA UNIAO
[D.O.U.] de 06.07.1994 (Braz.).
Decreto-Lei No. 2.848, de 7 de Dezembro de 1940, art. 288, DIAIo OFICIAL DA
UNIAO [D.O.U.] de 31.12.1940 (Braz.).
Law 12,529 of 201178 Law 12,846 of 201379 Criminal Law
Article 36. The acts under Article 5. "For the Low 8,137 of 1990
which any circumstance purposes of this Act, there (Economic Crimes Law)
have as an objective or shall be considered Article 4. The following
may have the following harmful to the Brazilian practices are crimes against
effects shall be considered and foreign public the economic o
violations to the economic administration any and all
order, regardless of fault, acts practiced by the legal Law 8,666 of 1993 (Public
even if not achieved: entities mentioned in the Procurement Law)
I - to limit, restrain or in sole paragraph of article 1 Article 9
any way injure free [sbelow] against the
competition or free Brazilian or foreign public Criminal Code (Decreto-
initiative; state; the principles that Lgi 2,848 of 1940)
II - to control the relevant govern public Article 288.84
market of goods or administration; or
services; international commitments
III - to arbitrarily increase undertaken by Brazil, as
profits; and follows: 8 '
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Section 3 The following
acts, among others, to the
extent to which they con-
form to the principles set
forth in the caput of this
article and its clauses, shall
characterize violations of
the economic order:
I - to agree, join, manipu-
late or adjust with competi-
tors, in any way:
a) the prices of goods or
services individually
offered;
b) the production or sale of
a restricted or limited
amount of goods or the
provision of a limited or
restricted number, volume
or frequency of services;
c) the division of parts or
segments of a potential or
current market of goods or
services by means of,
among others, the alloca-
tion of customers, suppliers,
regions or time periods;
d) prices, conditions, privi-
leges or refusal to partici-
pate in public bidding;
II - to promote, obtain or
influence the adoption of
uniform or agreed business
practices among competi-
tors.8 5
IV - in what concerns pub-
lic bids and contracts
[resulting thereof]:
a) to frustrate or defraud,
by means of collusion or
any other expedient, the
competitive nature of a
public bid;
b) to prevent, hinder or
defraud the performance of
any act within the scope of
a public bid;
c) to remove or seek the
removal of a bidder, by
means of a fraud or by
offering advantage of any
kind;
d) to defraud a public bid
or the contract resulting
thereof."'8 6
I - to abuse of market
power, to dominate the
market or eliminate, fully
or partially, competition by
means of any form of
adjustment or agreement
among companies;
1I - to undertake agree-
ment, adjustment or alli-
ance among suppliers, with
the aim of:
a) artificially fixing prices
or quantities sold or pro-
duced;
b) establishing regional
control of a market by a
company or group of com-
panies;
c) controlling network of
distributors or suppliers
harming competition.8 7
Article 90. To frustrate or
defraud, by means of
adjustment, combination or
any other expedient, the
competitive feature of a
bid, with the aim of
obtaining, for itself or any
other, advantage as a result
of winning the bid.8 8
Article 288. To undertake
an association of 3 (three)
or more persons with the
specific aim of committing
crimes.8 9
Article 35. The prosecution Article 29. The provisions [No corresponding provi-
of infringements against the of this Act do not exclude sion]
economic order does not the powers held by the
exclude the punishment of Administrative Council for
other practices deemed ille- Economic Defense
gal by other laws.9 0  (CADE), by the Ministry
of Justice and by the Minis-
try of Finance to investigate
and decide on facts that
may constitute a violation








Lei No. 12.529, de 30 de Novembro de 2011, art. 36 § 3, DIARIO OFICIAL DA
UNIAo [D.O.U.] de 01.12.2011 (Braz.).
Lei No. 12.846, de 1 de Agosto de 2013, art. 5(IV), DIARIO OFICIAL DA UNIAO
[D.O.U.] de 02.08.2013 (Braz.).
Lei No. 8.137, de 27 de Dezembro de 1990, art.4(I) - (II), DIARIO OFICIAL UNIAO
[D.O.U.] de 28.12.1990 (Braz.).
Lei No. 8.666, de 21 de Junho de 1993, art. 90, DIARIO OFICIAL DA UNIAO
[D.O.U.] de 06.07.1994 (Braz.).
Decreto-Lei No. 2.848, de 7 de Dezembro de 1940, art. 288, DIARIo OFICIAL DA
UNIAO [D.O.U.] de 31.12.1940 (Braz.).
Lei No. 12.529, de 30 de Novembro de 2011, art. 35, DIARIO OFICIAL DA UNIAO
[D.O.U.] de 01.12.2011 (Braz.).
Lei No. 12.846, de 1 de Agosto de 2013, art. 29, DIARIo OFICIAL DA UNIAO
[D.O.U.] de 02.08.2013 (Braz.).
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The table above clearly shows an overlap between the Antitrust, the
Anti-Corruption, and Criminal laws in regards to infringements. Pursu-
ant to Article 36, Section 3 of Law 12,529 of 2011; Article 5, Section 4 of
Law 12,846 of 2013; Article 4, Sections 1 and 2 of the Criminal Law; and
Articles 90 and 288 of the Criminal Law, the government can launch in-
vestigations and, possibly, convict a bid rigging practice. This is specified
under Article 36, Section 3(I)(d) of Law 12,529 of 2011; Article 5, Section
4(a) of Law 12,846 of 2013; and Article 90. Thus, there is no doubt that,
in principle, both CADE and CGU can impose penalties on the same bid
rigging practice, setting aside the criminal penalties that can be imposed
by the Judiciary.92
Article 29 of the Anti-Corruption Law is a provision designed to avoid
double jeopardy. 93 It clearly states that both CADE and CGU have the
power to convict a bid rigging practice implies that the same practice can,
in theory, be punished twice by such authorities. 94
The fact that the Anti-Corruption Law expressly recognizes the powers
of CADE to investigate and convict an antitrust infringement does not
eliminate the possibility of bis in idem. Even so, it is reasonable to as-
sume that if both bodies can investigate a given practice (bid rigging),
they should coordinate in order to mitigate overlaps and to increase syn-
ergies.95 Such should raise the following considerations:
a) The overlap is positive because it theoretically increases the chances
that a possible illegal practice is investigated and may be pun-
ished. 96 In practice, one of the two authorities may be willing to
investigate while the other may not. This is particularly good in an
institutional scenario like the Brazilian goverment, in which one of
the authorities is independent, while the other is directly subordi-
nated to the political power (the President of the Republic) and eas-
ily affected by political influence.97
92. According to current CADE's Commissioner Silveira, the so called "Grande Ste-
vens" precedent of the European Court of Human Rights may set a new standard
for the twofold system present in many countries, which allows administrative and
criminal sanctions for a given illegal practice. See Paulo Burnier da Silveira, 0
direito administrative sancionador e o principio non bis in idem na UE: uma
releitura a partir do caso "Grande Stevens" e os impactos na defesa da concorrincia
[The Administrative Penalty Law and the Non Bis In Dem Principle in the EU: A
Re-reading of the 'Grande Stevens' case and the Impact on Competition], 4
REVISTA DE DEFESA DA CONCORRENCIA 5, 7-8 n. 2 (2014) (Braz.).
93. Lei No. 12.846, de 1 de Agosto de 2013, art. 29, DIARIO OFICIAL DA UNIAO
[D.O.U.] de 02.08.2013 (Braz.).
94. Id.
95. The nature of this problem is exactly the same of the one faced in the scope of the
interaction between the Brazilian antitrust and regulatory authorities. See Denis
Alves Guimaries, Regulatory Policy Round Table: A Dialogue between Telecom-
munications and Antitrust Authorities, in COMMUNICATIONS AND COMPETITION
LAw: KEY ISSUES IN THE TELECOMS, MEDIA AND TECHNOLOGY SECTORS 397 -
411, (Fabrizio Cugia et al. eds., 2015).
96. See id.
97. See id. at 398-99.
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b) If both authorities are willing to investigate the violation, they
should coordinate to carry out possible simultaneous investigations
efficiently and with synergies.9 8 This would involve information
sharing, including evidence gathered in the files. Thus, it would be
possible to reach the same fact findings at the end of the investiga-
tions, which could allow both bodies to issue separate decisions
without bis in idem. There could still be two convictions, but the
penalties imposed should be agreed between CADE and CGU so
that the sum of the penalties equals to the maximum penalty to be
issued according to one of the laws-the Antitrust or the Anti-Cor-
ruption laws.
Notably, this possibility would require information and file sharing,
which is not currently required by law. But this requirement was men-
tioned in the CADE/CGU Cooperation Agreement Number 02/2014.99
In addition, it should be noted that the issuance of two convictions-
one by CADE and the other by CGU-with a sum of the penalties not
exceeding the maximum penalty established by law, would be a very com-
plex task. As it will be discussed in the next section, the penalties are
somehow similar, but different in detail. This would matter when the au-
thorities decide fines and penalties.
V. PENALTIES
As discussed in the previous section, the penalties imposed by the An-
titrust and Anti-Corruption Laws are quite similar. But there are differ-
ences in respect to several details that could, for instance, represent a
challenge for the authorities in case they decide to cooperate in the scope
of investigating and making decisions.
The similarities and differences can be seen more clearly in a compara-
tive chart as the one below:
Antitrust, anti-corruption and criminal (main) penalties [Table 1]
Law 12,529 of 2011100 Law 12,846 of 2013101 Criminal Lawl.0 2
Art. 37. A violation of the Art. 6. In the administrative Law 8,137 of 1990
economic order subjects one sphere, the following sanctions (Economic Crimes
to the following penalties: shall be applied to legal Law)
entities held accountable for Art. 4. [see chart
the harmful acts described in above]:
this Act: I - [see chart
above];
98. See id. at 400.
99. Decreto no. 02.2014, de 22 de janeiro de 2014, DiAiuo OFICIAL DE UNIAO
[D.O.U.] de 06.02.2014 (Braz.).
100. Lei No. 12.529, de 30 de Novembro de 2011, DIARIO OFICIAL DA UNIAO [D.O.U.]
de 01.12.2011 (Braz.).
101. Lei No. 12.846, de 1 de Agosto de 2013, DIARIO OFICIAL DA UNIAO [D.O.U.] de
02.08.2013 (Braz.).
102. See infra Table 2.
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I - in the case of a company,
a fine of one tenth (0.1%) to
twenty percent (20%) of the
gross sales of the company,
group or conglomerate, in the
last fiscal year before the
establishment of the
administrative proceeding, in
the field of the business
activity in which the violation
occurred, which will never be
less than the advantage
obtained, when possible the
estimation thereof;
[See comment below on
article 47]
II - in the case of other
individuals or public or
private legal entities, as well
as any associations of persons
or de facto or de jure legal
entities, even if temporary,
incorporated or
unincorporated, which do not
perform business activity, not
being possible to use the gross
sales criteria, the fine will be
between fifty thousand reais
(R$ 50,000.00) to two billion
reais (R$ 2,000,000,000.00);
III - if the administrator is
directly or indirectly
responsible for the violation,
when negligence or willful
misconduct is proven, a fine
of one-percent (1%) to
twenty-percent (20%) of that
applied to the company, in the
case set forth in Item I of the
caput of this article, or to
legal entities, in the cases set
forth in item II of the caput
of this article.
I - a fine in an amount
ranging from 0.1% (one tenth
percent) to 20% (twenty
percent) of the gross revenues
earned in the financial year
preceding the financial year in
which the administrative
proceeding was commenced,
excluding taxes, which penalty
fine shall never be less than
the advantage obtained,
whenever such advantage may
be estimated (. . )
§ 3 The imposition of the
sanctions set forth in this
Article does not, in any event,
exclude the obligation to fully
repair the damages caused.
§ 4 In the case of item I of
the caput, if it is not possible
to adopt the criterion of the
value of the legal entity's
gross revenue, the fine shall
range from R$ 6,000.00 (six








II - [see chart
above]:
a) [see chart above];
b) [see chart above];




(two) to 5 (five)
years and fine.1 13
Law 8,666 of 1993
(Public
Procurement Law)





(two) to 4 (four)









(one) to 3 (three)
years. 1 1 5
Sole paragraph. The
penalty is increased
up to fifty percent if
the association is




Lei No. 12.529, de 30 de Novembro de 2011, art. 37(I) - (III), DIARIO OFICIAL DA
UNIAo [D.O.U.] de 01.12.2011 (Braz.).
Lei No. 12.529, de 30 de Novembro de 2011, art. 38, DIARIo OFICIAL DA UNIAO
[D.O.U.] de 01.1.2.2011 (Braz.).
Lei No. 12.529, de 30 de Novembro de 2011, art. 45(I) - (VII), DIARIo OFICIAL DA
UNIAo [D.O.U.] de 01.12.2011 (Braz.).
Lei No. 12.846, de 1 de Agosto de 2013, art. 6(I) § 3-4, DIARio OFICIAL DA UNIAO
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§ 1 In case of recurrence the
fines shall be doubled.10
Art. 38. Without prejudice to
the penalties set forth in
Article 37 of this Law, when
so required according to the
seriousness of the facts or
public interest, one or more of
the following penalties may be
imposed:
II - ineligibility for official
financing and for participating
in biddings when the objective
is acquisitions, divestitures,
performance of works and
services, provision of public
services, in the federal, state,
municipal and Federal District
public administration, as well
as in indirect administration
entities, for a term of not less
than 5 (five) years;
IV - recommendation to the
respective public agencies so
that:
b) the violator be denied
installment payment of federal
taxes owned by him, or that
tax incentives or public





[See article 17, V, of the
Presidential Decree 8,420 of
2015]
Art. 19. Upon occurrence of
the acts described in article 5
[harmful acts against the
Brazilian and foreign public
administration] of this Act,
the Federal Union, the states,
the Federal District (Brasilia)
and the municipalities,
through their respective Public
Attorneys or legal
representation agencies, or
equivalent, as well as the
Public Ministry Office
(Minist6rio Pdiblico) may
bring action with the purpose
of having the following
sanctions applied to infringing
legal entities:
IV - prohibition of receiving
incentives, subsidies, grants,
donations or loans from public
agencies or entities and public
financial institutions or from
financial institutions
controlled by the government,
for a minimum period of 1
(one) and a maximum period
of 5 (five) years;108
Law 8,666 of 1993 - Public
Procurement Law 1 0 9 :
Art. 88. The penalties
established in items III
[temporary suspension of the
right of participating in bids
and prohibition of contracting
with government, for a period
not longer than 2 years] and
IV [one is declared
noncompliant for participating
in bids or contracting with the
government] of the preceding
article may be also applied
over the companies or
individuals that, in the scope
of the contracts regulated by
this Law:
II - have practiced illegal acts
with the aim of frustrating the
objectives of the bid;
Lei No. 12.846, de 1 de Agosto de 2013, art. 19(IV), DIARio OFICIAL IDA UNIAO
[D.O.U.] de 02.08.2013 (Braz.).
Lei No. 8.666, de 21 de Junho de 1993, art. 88, DiAuo OFICIAL D)A UNIAO
[D.O.U.] de 06.07.1994 (Braz.).
Lei No. 8.666, de 21 de Junho de 1993, art. 88, DIAIuo OFICIAL DA UNIAO
[D.O.U.] de 06.07.1.994 (Braz.).
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V - the company divestiture,
transfer or corporate control,
sale of assets or partial
interruption of activity;
VI - the wrongdoer be
prohibited from carrying on
trade on its own behalf or as
representative of legal entity
for a eriod of five (5) years;
andl
Art. 45. In the application of
the penalties set forth in this
Law, the following shall be
taken into consideration:
I - the seriousness of the
violation;
II - the good faith of the
transgressor;
III - the advantage obtained
or envisaged by the violator;
IV - whether the violation
was consummated or not;
V - the degree of injury or
threatened injury to free
competition, the national
economy, consumers, or third
parties;
VI - the negative economic
effects produced in the
market;
VII - the economic status of
the transgressor; and 05
VIII - any recurrence
[No corresponding provision]
III - demonstrate to be
noncompliant for contracting
with the government due to
the practice of illegal acts.1 10
Art. 19. (. . ):
II - partial suspension or
interdiction of the legal
entity's activities;
III - compulsory dissolution
of the legal entity;' 11
Art. 7. The following aspects
shall be taken into account in
the application of the
sanctions:
I - the seriousness of the
infraction;
II - the advantage obtained or
pursued by the offender;
III - whether or not the
infraction was completed;
IV - the level of harm or of
the risk of harm;
V - the negative effect caused
by the infraction;
VI - the financial situation of
the offender
VII - the cooperation of the
legal entity in the
investigation of the infraction;
[See article 17, V, of the
Presidential Decree 8,420 of
2015]
VIII - the existence of
internal integrity mechanisms
and procedures, auditing and
encouragement to whistle-
blowing, as well as the
effective implementation of
codes of ethics and conduct
within the legal person;
111. Lei No. 12.846, de 1 de Agosto de 2013, art. 19, DiAmo OFICIAL DA UNIAO
[D.O.U.] de 02.08.2013 (Braz.).
112. Lei No. 12.846, de 1 de Agosto de 2013, art. 7(I) - (IX), DIARIO OFICIAL DA
UNIAo [D.O.U.] de 02.08.2013 (Braz.).
113. Lei No. 8.137, de 27 de Dezembro de 1990, art. 4(11), DIARIO OFICIAL DA UNIAO
[D.O.U.] de 28.12.1.990 (Braz.).
114. Lei No. 8.666, de 21 de Junho de 1993, art. 90, DiAmio OFICIAL DA UNIAO
[D.O.U.] de 06.07.1994 (Braz.).
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[No corresponding provision] IX - the value of the
contracts between the legal
entity and the harmed public
agency or entity, and
[No corresponding provision, Sole paragraph. The
but CADE issued its parameters of evaluation of
Guidelines on Competition mechanisms and procedures
Compliance Programs] provided for in item VIII of
the caput shall be set forth in
a Decree to be issued by the
Federal Government.112
A. ADMINISTRATIVE FINES ON COMPANIES WITH SALES
Article 37(I) of the Antitrust Law and Article 6(I) of the Anti-Corrup-
tion Law set the range of administrative fines that can be imposed when a
company is convicted..1.6 Both penalties range from one-tenth of a per-
cent to twenty percent of the gross sales of the offender (excluding taxes)
from the last fiscal year prior to the launching of the administrative
proceeding.117
Even so, there are some significant differences amongst the two penal-
ties. Under the Antitrust Law, the fine imposed on the offender may
apply to only one company that is being investigated in the administrative
proceeding, or can apply only to the gross sales of the whole group or
conglomerate.11 8 Under the Anti-Corruption Law, there is no regulation
on whether a single company or the whole group should be fined.119 Ar-
ticle 6(I) should be interpreted as if it had the same wording of Article
37(I) of the Antitrust Law on company, group, or conglomerate, for two
main reasons:
a) Article 4, section 2, of the Anti-Corruption Law states:
"The parent companies, subsidiaries, affiliates or co-members of a
consortium, within the scope of the respective contract, will be
jointly and severally liable for the practice of the acts described in
this Act, being such liability limited to the payment of penalty fines
and full compensation of the damages caused." 120
b) Article 16, section 5 of the Anti-Corruption Law states: "The effects
of the leniency agreements to be extended to the legal entities of
the same economic group, in fact and in law, subject to such legal
entities also signing the agreement becoming bound by the condi-
115. Decreto No. 2.848, de 7 de Dezembro de 1940, art. 288, DIARIO OFICIAL DA
UNIxo [D.O.U.] de 31.12.1940 (Braz.).
116. See Lei No. 12.529, Article 37(I), de 30 de Novembro de 2011, DIARIO OFICIAL DA
UNIAo [D.O.U.] de 01.12.2011 (Braz.); see also Lei No. 12.846, Article 6(I), de 1 de
Agosto de 2013, DiAiuo OFICIAL DA UNIAO [D.O.U.] de 02.08.2013 (Braz.).
117. Id.
118. See Lei No. 12.529, de 30 de Novembro de 2011, DIARIO OFICIAL DA UNIAO
[D.O.U.] de 01.12.2011 (Braz.).
119. See Lei No. 12.846, Article 6(I), de 1 de Agosto de 2013, DiARno OFICIAL DA
UNIAo [D.O.U.] de 02.08.2013 (Braz.).
120. Id. art. 4 § 2.
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tions set forth therein." 1 2 1
The above-mentioned provisions reflect an economic logic intended to
punish or benefit economically related entities involved in the practice.
There is not a formalistic ratio designed to focus on a particular legal
entity.
Another difference exists in the concept of gross sales. It is well known
that the "field of the business activity in which the violation occurred" 1 2 2
is a Brazilian alternative formula that ended up being approved by Con-
gress in substitution for the traditional criterion of the relevant market.1.2 3
Regarding the interface between the Antitrust and Anti-Corruption laws,
it is important to recognize that the Antitrust Law generally applies the
fines to a specific portion of the gross sales of the company, group, or
conglomerate, but not to the total gross sales of the entity. This is not
applicable to the Anti-Corruption Law because there is not an antitrust
or relevant market discussion in anti-corruption cases, and there has
never been an idea of restricting the fine to a given portion of the gross
sales of the entity so that the fines apply over total gross sales.
B. ADMINISTRATIVE FINES ON ENTITIES WITHOUT SALES AND
EMPLOYEES OF THE COMPANIES OR ENTITIES;
ADMINISTRATIVE FINES ON ADMINISTRATORS
OR MANAGERS OF COMPANIES
Article 37(11) of the Antitrust Law and Article 6, section 4, of the Anti-
Corruption Law set the range of the administrative fines that can be im-
posed when there is a conviction of an entity that does not perform busi-
ness activities and, consequently, does not undertake sales (the concept
of gross sales is inapplicable). 12 4 Under the Antitrust Law, a fine applied
to these entities ranges from fifty thousand reais (R$ 50,000.00) to two
billion reais (R$ 2,000,000,000.00), while under the Anti-Corruption Law,
it ranges from six thousand reais (R$ 6,000.00) to sixty million reais (R$
60,000,000.00).125 The reason for the difference is a matter of legislative
drafting-the bill that became the Anti-Corruption Law established the
range because it was the same range in force in the Antitrust Law at that
time. The range was updated after the new Antitrust Law was enacted,
121. Id. art. 16 § 5.
122. Lei No. 12.529, de 30 de Novembro de 2011, art. 37(I), DiARIO OFICIAL DA UNIAO
[D.O.U.] de 01.1.2.2011 (Braz.).
123. See Denis Alves Guimarres & Daniel Oliveira Andreoli, Comentirios ao artigo 37
- multas por infragdo da ordem econ6mica (Comments on the article 37- antitrust
fines), in COMENTARIOS A NOVA LEI DE DEFESA DA CONCORRPNCIA (COMMENTS
ON THE NEW BRAZILIAN ANTITRUST LAW) 150 - 171, 153 (E.C. Anders et al. eds.,
2012).
124. See Lei No. 12.529, de 30 de Novembro de 2011, art. 37(11), DIARIO OFICIAL DA
UNIAo [D.O.U.] de 01.12.2011 (Braz.); see Lei No. 12.846, de 1 de Agosto de 2013,
art. 6 § 4, DIARIo OFICIAL DA UNIAO [D.O.U.] de 02.08.2013 (Braz.).
125. See Lei No. 12.529, de 30 de Novembro de 2011, art. 37(11), DIAmo OFICIAL )A
UNIAo [D.O.U.] de 01.12.2011 (Braz.); see Lei No. 12.846, de 1 de Agosto de 2013,
art. 6 § 4, DIARIO OFICIAL D)A UNIAO [D.O.U.] de 02.08.2013 (Braz.).
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but the same change has not been undertaken in the Anti-Corruption
Law.1 26
Still with respect to Article 37(11) of the Antitrust Law, in addition to
being applicable to all entities that do not undertake sales (the concept of
gross sales is inapplicable), it is also applicable to the individuals that are
not targeted by Article 37(III).127 Moreover, the Article applies to the
employees of companies undertaking sales and employees of all types of
entities not undertaking sales. 1 2 8 Therefore, under the Antitrust Law,
mere employees without the power of making decisions, but able to con-
cur with an anticompetitive practice, are punishable and the fines have
the same range as the ones applicable to the entities that do not perform
sales. 1 2 9
Conversely, Article 37(111) of the Antitrust Law targets administrators
or managers that are directly or indirectly responsible for the infringe-
ment, when negligence or willful misconduct is proven.13 0 The fines
range from one percent to twenty percent of the fine applied to the com-
pany according to Article 37(I) (in the presence of sales or entity) and
Article 37(11) (in the absence of sales).131
Finally, in regards to penalties applicable to individuals, a major differ-
ence exists between the Antitrust and Anti-Corruption laws. While the
former establishes fines applicable to administrators, managers, and mere
employees, the latter does not set any fines applicable to individuals. 1 3 2
It is understood that the Anti-Corruption Law "provides for the adminis-
trative and civil proceedings aiming at holding legal entities accountable
for the practice of acts against the Brazilian or foreign public administra-
tion. . .. "133 Even so, it is undeniable that at least one individual must act
so that a company can infringe the law.
C. OTHER PENALTIES: ADMINISTRATIVE ANTITRUST AND JUDICIAL
ANTI-CORRUPTION; JUDICIARY ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT; AND
PUBLIC PROSECUTION OFFICE'S OVERSIGHT OF
ADMINISTRATIVE ANTI-CORRUPTION ENFORCEMENT
It is justifiable to compare Article 38 of the Antitrust Law and Article
19 of the Anti-Corruption because the former establishes administrative
126. See Lei No. 10.149, de 21 de Dezembro de 2000, art. 35, DIARo OFICIAL DA
UNIAo [D.O.U.] de 22.12.2000 (Braz.); see Lei No. 8.884, de 11 de Junho de 1994,
DIARIo OFICIAL DA UNIAO [D.O.U.] de 13.6.1990 (Braz.); see Lei No. 12.529, de
30 de Novembro de 2011, DIAIIo OFICIAL DA UNIAO [D.O.U.] de 01.12.2011
(Braz.).
127. See Lei No. 12.529, de 30 de Novembro de 2011, art. 37(II)-(III), DiA/Iio OFICIAL
DA UNIAO [D.O.U.] de 01.12.2011 (Braz.).
128. See id.
129. See id.
130. Id. at art. 37(111).
131. Id. at art. 37(I) - (III).




penalties, while the latter establishes judicial penalties.1 3 4 Indeed, all
penalties established by the Antitrust Law are administrative and may be
applied by CADE.1 3 5 Meanwhile, the Anti-Corruption Law sets adminis-
trative penalties that can be imposed by federal (CGU having a concur-
rent power in this case), state, and local highest authorities (that may
have suffered injuries through the practices forbidden by the Law in Arti-
cle 5).136 The Anti-Corruption Law also sets judicial penalties that can be
imposed upon the request of the Federal Government, the States and the
Federal District, the Municipalities (also because of possible injuries suf-
fered as a result of the practices forbidden by Article 5.137 Federal or
state Public Prosecution Offices can prosecute offenders that may have
injured the public administration within their jurisdiction. 38
Upon analyzing Article 38 of the Antitrust Law and Article 19 of the
Anti-Corruption Law, the list below shows that antitrust administrative
penalties imposed by CADE are similar to anti-corruption judicial
penalties:
a) Article 38(11) and (IV)(b) of the Antitrust Law,139 ViS-d-vis Article
19 (IV) of the Anti-Corruption Law,140 and Article 88(11) and (III)
of the Public Procurement Law (which the Anti-Corruption Law
references)141 all regulate penalties. This includes suspension of the
right of participating in bids and denial of access to credit from pub-
lic financial institutions and agencies, and to public incentives and
subsidies;1 42
b) Article 38(V) of the Antitrust Law, vis-d-vis Article 19(11) of the
Anti-Corruption Law, regulates penalties such as partial suspension
of the activities or transference of the corporate control;1.43 and
c) Article 38(VI) of the Antitrust Law, vis-a-vis Article 1(III) of Anti-
Corruption, regulates penalties such as full termination of
134. See Lei No. 12.529, de 30 de Novembro de 2011, art. 38, Didrio Oficial da Unido
[D.O.U.] de 01.12.2011 (Braz.); see also Lei No. 12.846, de 1 de Agosto de 2013,




138. See Lei No. 12.529, de 30 de Novembro de 2011, art. 38, Didrio Oficial da Uniio
[D.O.U.] de 01.12.2011 (Braz.); see Lei No. 12.846, de 1 de Agosto de 2013, art. 19,
Didrio Oficial da Unido [D.O.U.] de 02.08.2013 (Braz.).
139. Lei No. 12.529, de 30 de Novembro de 2011, art. 38(11), (IV)(b), Didrio Oficial da
Unido [D.O.U.] de 01.12.2011 (Braz.)
140. Lei No. 12.846, de 1 de Agosto de 2013, art. 19(IV), Didrio Oficial da Uniao
[D.O.U.] de 02.08.2013 (Braz.).
141. Lei No. 8.666, de 21 de Junho de 1993, art. 88, Dibrio Oficial da Unido [D.O.U.] de
06.07.1994 (Braz.)
142. See Lei No. 12.529, de 30 de Novembro de 2011, art. 38(11), (IV)(b), Didrio Oficial
da Uniio [D.O.U.] de 01.12.2011 (Braz.); see Lei No. 12.846, de 1 de Agosto de
2013, art. 19(IV), Dibrio Oficial da Uniho [D.O.U.] de 02.08.2013 (Braz.); see Lei
No. 8.666, de 21 de Junho de 1993, art. 88 (II) - (III), Dibrio Oficial da Unido
[D.O.U.] de 06.07.1994 (Braz.)
143. Lei No. 12.529, de 30 de Novembro de 2011, art. 38(V), Didrio Oficial da Unido
[D.O.U.] de 01.12.2011 (Braz.); Lei No. 12.846, de 1 de Agosto de 2013, art. 19(11),
Didrio Oficial da Unido [D.O.U.] de 02.08.2013 (Braz.)
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activities. 144
It is important to clarify that the Judiciary is not excluded from the
enforcement of the Antitrust Law, but this can happen in the following
situations:
a) First, according to Article 47 of the Antitrust Law, injured parties
can request a judicial order to cease respective anticompetitive
practices, and to obtain compensation for the damages. 145 Al-
though the possibility of judicial action before CADE's decision is
explicitly provided by the law, it is not common because judges pre-
fer to have access to the decision of the specialized administrative
tribunal.
b) Additionally, a party in an administrative proceeding before CADE
can appeal to the Judiciary with respect to any CADE decision. 14 6
In both cases, it should be noted that an antitrust matter before the
Judiciary is handled by a single generalist judge and not by any judge1 47
of the State or Federal courts, the Superior Court of Justice (STJ), or the
Supreme Court of Justice (STF), who decides constitutional matters
only.
Besides Article 38 of the Antitrust Law and Article 19 of the Anti-
Corruption Law, another important provision of the Anti-Corruption
Law should be addressed. Article 20 establishes that the Public Prosecu-
tion Office, in addition to the power to request the enforcement of judi-
cial penalties, can request the Judiciary to enforce the administrative
penalties set forth in Article 6, provided that the administrative authori-
ties fail to enforce them.148
A judicial decision about such failure or omission does not seem to be
simple. Specifically, the law seems to explicitly attribute to the Public
Prosecution Office a huge power to oversee the administrative enforce-
ment of the Anti-Corruption Law, and the Judiciary only has the discre-
tion to decide whether there has been a failure or omission.149 On the
one hand, this power attributed to the Public Prosecution Office can in-
crease the chances of effective enforcement of the Anti-Corruption Law.
On the other hand, it may also open a door for excessive oversight and
intrusion at the federal, state, and local governments levels to enforce the
Law.
144. Lei No. 12.529, de 30 de Novembro de 2011, art. 38, Didrio Oficial da Uniao
[D.O.U.] de 01.12.2011 (Braz.); Lei No. 12.846, de 1 de Agosto de 2013, art. 1,
Didrio Oficial da Unido [D.O.U.] de 02.08.2013 (Braz.)
145. Lei No. 12.529, de 30 de Novembro de 2011, art. 47, Didrio Oficial da Unido
[D.O.U.] de 01.12.2011 (Braz.).
146. Id. at art. 65.
147. Seminar on "the challenges of legalization of antitrust, regulation and interna-
tional trade," CrR. FOR ECON. & Soc. RIGHTs STUDIES (Nov. 12-13), http://www
.migalhas.com.br/Eventos/18,M229077,51045-Os+desafios+da+j udicializacao+da+
defesa+da+concorrencia+da+regulacao (last visited Nov. 22, 2015).
148. Lei No. 12.846, de 1 de Agosto de 2013, art. 20, DiARuo OFICIAL DA UNIAO
[D.O.U.] de 02.08.2013 (Braz.).
149. Id. at art. 15, 20.
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D. PARAMETERS FOR SETTING THE ADMINISTRATIVE FINES WITHIN
THE BROAD LEGAL RANGES
Finally, Article 45 of the Antitrust Law and Article 7 of the Anti-Cor-
ruption Law establish the parameters, within the broad ranges provided
by the laws, of how authorities should set the actual fines.150
While these Articles are quite similar, it is interesting how the Anti-
Corruption Law, through the issuance of its regulating Presidential De-
cree 8,420 of 2015, went far beyond the fines imposed by the Antitrust
regulation. In the Antitrust regulation, there is not any administrative
regulation made by CADE regarding criteria to set the fines, and thus,
parties have to rely on case law.' 5 1
As shown in the chart above, the legal criterion to set Antitrust and
Anti-Corruption fines are quite simple and do not provide significant gui-
dance for the authorities. The exception is the novelty brought by the
Anti-Corruption Law: the possibility of reducing fines as a result of the
existence of effective compliance programs. 152
VI. LENIENCY AGREEMENTS
After discussing the cooperation between the authorities involved in
cartel enforcement, the core roles and features of the Public Prosecution
Office, CADE, CGU, the administrative antitrust, anti-corruption, and
criminal infringements and penalties related to the practice of bid rigging,
this section focuses on what seems to be the biggest challenges to a har-
monious enforcement of the three leniency regimes.
A. THE RISE AND GROWTH OF ANTITRUST LENIENCY AGREEMENTS
Antitrust leniency agreements were incorporated into the Brazilian le-
gal system through a legislative amendment to the former Antitrust Law
(Law 8,884 of 1994) in 2000.153 The first agreement was signed in 2003.154
Section two of this paper mentions that whistleblowing has been an
important means of gathering the necessary evidence to support a request
for a search and seizure warrant. Frequently, the evidence gathered
through leniency agreements can also be grounds for the issuance of war-
rants-although there are some cases in which the leniency beneficiaries
provide authorities with sufficient proof to the extent that the authority
150. See Lei No. 12.529, de 30 de Novembro de 2011, art. 45, DIARIO OFICIAL DA
UNIAo [D.O.U.] de 01.12.2011 (Braz.); see Lei No. 12.846, de 1 de Agosto de 2013,
art. 7, DIARIO OFICIAL DA UNIAO [D.O.U.] de 02.08.2013 (Braz.).
151. See Decreto No. 8.420, de 18 de Margo de 2015, art. 15, DIARIO OFICIAL DA
UNIAo [D.O.U.] de 19.03.2015 (Braz.).
152. See Lei No. 12.529, de 30 de Novembro de 2011, DIARIo OFICIAL DA UNIAO
[D.O.U.] de 01.12.2011 (Braz.).
153. See Lei No. 12.846, de 1 de Agosto de 2013, art. 16(11), §2, DIARIo OFICIAL DA
UNIAo [D.O.U.] de 02.08.2013 (Braz.); see also, Portaria CGU No. 909, de 7 de
Abril de 2015, DiAuo OFICIAL DA UNIAO, publicado 13.7.2016 (Braz.).
154. See Calliari & Guimaraes, supra note 26, at 68-69.
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no longer needs to conduct raids.' 5 5
Notably, leniency has progressively gained importance as one of the
main cartel deterrence tools.1 5 6 The thirteen years since the first leniency
agreement can be divided into three phases. The first phrase was an ini-
tial slow learning curve from 2003 to 2006, but was extremely important
in building the foundation for the "impressive growth of the leniency pro-
gram from 2007 to 2010," which was the second phase.157 The third phase
included the consolidation of the leniency program from 2011 to 2016,
which incorporated the enactment of the new Antitrust Law and the
maintenance of the leniency program as a core Antitrust policy.15 8 This
occurred even before this policy faced competition. CADE, by taking
important measures, successfully enforced this new law.1 5 '
Seven agreements were executed in the first phase, eighteen in the sec-
ond, and forty-nine in the third, which included both the original leniency
agreements (acordos de leniincia) and their amendments1 60 (aditivos), as
shown in the chart below.1 6 1
Acordosde Lenifncia e Aditivos assinados .
so~P , . .... I57~ - ' ~ - =I..... ......... ..... ..
2003 2004 2005 2005 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 '2012T 2013 2014 2015 2016
2~m 1 1 4 5 3
.Ao s 1 1 1 4 1 2 4 10 1 0
It is important to note that the Brazilian leniency program has achieved
significant international recognition, with several of the seventy-four
agreements already being executed in relation to international cartels.1 6 2
155. See id.
156. See id. at 68-69.
157. See id. at 69.
158. See Balango 2015, CADE (Jan. 2016), http://www.cade.gov.br/servicos/imprensa/
balancos-e-apresentacoes/balanco-2015.pdf.
159. Calliari & Guimaraes, supra note 26, at 68.
160. An amendment to a previous leniency agreement is allowed by CADE when the
applicant brings new information about the practice previously reported. CADE
may agree with amending the original agreement if the "new information" (it may
be an old information not previously disclosed) is relevant to make any correction
to the course of the investigation, and the applicant presents a plausible justifica-
tion for not having informed CADE about the new information at the time that
the original leniency agreement was being negotiated.
161. Balango 2015, supra note 158.
162. See Calliari & Guimaraes, supra note 26, at 68.
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"Although the first leniency agreement was executed in 2003," in Janu-
ary 2006 the first regulation on the matter was issued, SDE Ordinance
Number 4 of January 5.163 This development, built on "the difficulties
faced in the first few years, [certainly] had a crucial role in improving the
program and making it more attractive to potential applicants."1 6 4
"Based on the experience gained since then, as well as [through] the in-
tensive exchanges" held with agencies from different jurisdictions, in
March 2010, the Ministry of Justice (MJ) issued a new ordinance (Ordi-
nance Number 456 of March 15) with a new leniency regulation that has
"significant advances in terms of transparency and certainty." 1 6 5
Other expected changes to the leniency program finally came into force
with the approval of the new Antitrust Law. 166 A great change in the
new law is the clarity and security on the effects of leniency.1 67 It also
clarifies the punishment of the individuals involved in cartel activities de-
fined in the Economic Crimes Law (Lie No. 8,137 of 1990), the bid rig-
ging violations in the Public Procurement Law (Lie No. 8,666 of 1993),
and the criminal association offense in the Criminal Code (Decreto-Lei
No. 2,848 of 1940).168
More importantly, leniency is also becoming a core bid rigging deter-
rence tool. 16 9 It is important that CADE continues to diligently invest in
fighting bid rigging not only as a means of strengthening cooperation with
other governmental entities that have more experience in the field, such
as CGU and TCU.1 70 CADE should also advocate widely about the im-
portance of the leniency program because it constitutes a low cost, but
high benefit monitoring tool. Fortunately, such advocacy also includes a
close exchange of information between the three main institutions enforc-
ing their respective leniency regimes.
B. THE ADMINISTRATIVE ANTI-CORRUPTION LENIENCY AGREEMENT
CREATED BY THE LAw 12,846 OF 2013
As mentioned above, Monebhurrun also addressed the antitrust heri-
tage sought by the Anti-Corruption Law regarding the leniency
agreements:
The influence of competition law in the drafting of the anti-corrup-
tion law is worthy and interesting in that it confirms the dialogue
between the two fields. Indeed, the 2013 anti-corruption law enables
public bodies to enter into leniency agreements with private entities
responsible for anti-corruption acts provided for in the said statute.
Like in competition law proceedings, the anti-corruption legal re-
163. Id. at 69.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 69-70.
167. Id. at 70.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 69.
170. Id. at 68.
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gime enables private companies to collaborate with the public ad-
ministration to help identify other companies involved in a given
corruption case and to readily obtain information and documents
proving the illicit act. The leniency agreements has to fulfill some
conditions to be effective: the private entity must take the initiative
of the collaboration and express an initial interest for such a proce-
dure; the private entity must stop any involvement in the illicit act as
soon as a leniency agreement is proposed; it must admit its participa-
tion in the illicit enterprise and accept a complete and permanent
collaboration with the investigators, ready to participate in all pro-
ceedings at its own expense as long as they last. Abiding to the leni-
ency agreement can reduce the fine due to be paid by the participant
and enable him to continue benefitting from public subsidies. A le-
gal tool - the leniency program -, originally pertaining to the compe-
tition law sphere, has thus been used as a model and its logic and
spirit have been efficiently transported to the anti-corruption field
where they are expected to be enforced for a double positive effect:
combating corruption and protecting competition. It appears as an
extension of competition law in another related law field and the
logic here is a complementary and not a conflicting one. 171
While CADE has executed seventy-four leniency agreements (fifty-
seven original ones and seventeen amendments) from 2003 to October
2015, CGU has signed only one since the enactment of Law No. 12,846 of
2013.172
CGU faces a unique opportunity, but at the same time, a threat to its
capability to effectively enforce the new Anti-Corruption Law. The Law
regulates the administration and assemblage of an internal CGU struc-
ture to enforce regulations during situations like the rise and develop-
ment of Operation Car Wash.173 The CGU is a task force led by the
Public Prosecution Office and the Federal Police to dismantle the biggest
Brazilian corruption scandal of all time.1 7 4 The scandal was about a pub-
lic procurement promoted by the state oil company Petrobras, in which
the bidders were construction companies, and the accusations alleged the
existence of bid rigging and bribery.1 75 This case is significant due to its
economic importance and the fact that it involves several important Bra-
zilian politicians.1 76 Inevitably, this leads to huge pressure for CGU,
which is not a politically independent body because it includes the Public
Prosecution Office and CADE task force led by the Public Prosecution
171. See Monebhurrun, Fighting Corruption, supra note 1, at 84.
172. See Balango 2015, supra note 158.
173. See Lei No. 12.846, de 1 de Agosto de 2013, art. 8, DiAiuo OFICIAL DA UNIAO
[D.O.U.] de 02.08.2013 (Braz.); see also, Brian Nicholson, 'Brazil's Operation Car
Wash', INT'L BAR Ass'N. (Apr. 8, 2015), http://www.ibanet.org/Article/De-
tail.aspx?ArticleUid=7960bl46-65c4-4fc2-bb6a-c6fbb434cdl.6 (visited Dec. 13,
2015).




Office and the Federal Police.1 77
Currently, CGU is investigating twenty-nine companies in the scope of
Operation Car Wash, and six of these companies have declared their in-
terest in executing a leniency agreement in Law No. 12,846 of 2013.178
Notably, CADE took more than two years to execute its first leniency
agreement after the enactment of the leniency program in 2000 through
Law No. 10,149,179 which incorporated Articles 35(B) and 35(C) into the
Antitrust Law that was in force at the time, Law No. 8,884 of 1994.180
Thus, it is always useful to remember that the main point of the compari-
son is to demonstrate how the Brazilian legal system can benefit from the
exchange of experiences between CADE, CGU, and the Public Prosecu-
tion Office.
C. THE CRIMINAL LENIENCY AGREEMENTS
While CADE and CGU have been developing their experiences in exe-
cuting leniency agreements under what can be called single regulations
(antitrust under the consecutive Law No. 8,884 of 1994 and Law No.
12,529 of 2011; anti-corruption under the Law No. 12,846 of 2013), the
criminal leniency agreements were incorporated into the Brazilian legal
system long before then.1 81
Initially, confessions in the scope of criminal proceedings only consti-
tuted evidence against the party making the confession.1.8 2 But, this stan-
dard started to be replaced by one that permitted the admission of
assertions by a party against himself as evidence.' 83 That being said, as-
sertions of the same party against others involved in criminal activity
were also admitted.1 84 At that time, benefits were not granted to the
party reporting the violations because of the identification of other
177. See Lei No. 12.846, de 1 de Agosto de 2013, art. 8, DiAmuo OFICIAL DA UNIAO
[D.O.U.] de 02.08.2013 (Braz.). (There is not a public body totally immune from
political pressure. The comment above refers to the fact that the structures of the
Public Prosecution Office and CADE count on some important institutional guar-
antees against political interference).
178. "A empresa deve reparar integralmente o dano que causou", frisa ministro da CGU,
CGU.GOV.BR (Oct. 19, 2015, 12:15), http://www.cgu.gov.br/noticias/2015/10/a-em-
presa-deve-reparar-integralmente-o-dano-que-causou-frisa-ministro-da-cgu.
179. Maria Beauchamp Salomi, 0 Acordo De Leniancia E Seus Reflexos Penais (2012)
(unpublished Master's dissertation, University of Sro Paulo) (on file with autor).
180. See Lei No. 10.149, de 21 de Dezembro de 2000, art. 35, DIARIO OFICIAL DA
UNIAO [D.O.U.] de 22.12.2000 (Braz.); see Lei No. 8.884, de 11 de Junho de 1994,
DIARIO OFICIAL DA UNIAO [D.O.U.] de 13.6.1990 (Braz.); see Lei No. 12.529, de
30 de Novembro de 2011, DIARIO OFICIAL DA UNIAO [D.O.U.] de 01.12.2011
(Braz.).
181. E.g. N6fi Cordeiro, Delagdo Premiada Na Legislagdo Brasileira [Rewarded Dela-
tion in the Brazilian Laws], 37 RESVISTA DA AJURISE 273, 275 (2010).
182. See Irving Marc Shikasho Nagima, Of Confession in Criminal Procedural Law,
direitoNet (Aug. 12, 2012), https://translate.google.com/translate?hl=en&sl=pt&u=
http://www.direitonet.com.br/artigos/exibir/7428/Da-confissao-no-direito-processu
al-penal&prev=search.
183. See Cordeiro, supra note 181.
184. See id.
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criminals.18 5 Rather, only confessions about the acts practiced by the
party were taken into account as a mitigating factor for the purpose of
setting the criminal penalty. 186
Later, more specifically in the 1990s, different laws started regulating
criminal leniency agreements similarly to the Criminal Organization Law
(Law No. 12,850 of 2013), including the possibility of granting benefits to
the leniency applicant as a consequence of identifying other criminals and
producing evidence against them.1 87
Discussing the early ages of the criminal leniency agreements in Brazil,
the scope of this paper is limited to the comparison between the newest
leniency regimes, the administrative Antitrust, Anti-Corruption, and
Criminal Organization laws (Law No. 12,850 of 2013).
Taking into account only Operation Car Wash, seventy criminal leni-
ency agreements have already been executed.18 8 While these agreements
concern investigations on the same kind of infringements investigated by
CADE and CGU, the Public Prosecution Office and the Police Chief In-
vestigators have the power to execute leniency agreements to a much
broader range of criminal infringements rather than just antitrust and
anti-corruption violations. 189 Thus, it is not a surprise if their numbers in
general (agreements executed) are much more than the ones handled by
CADE and CGU. But the fact that seventy agreements have been exe-
cuted in the context of a single investigation (Car Wash) is indeed
impressive.1 90
The direct comparison between the legal provisions in the three re-
gimes is once again very useful to identify their similarities and differ-
ences, and what can facilitate the understanding of the opportunities and
challenges faced by enforcers and applicants, so that the regimes alto-
gether offer adequate incentives for the parties involved. If this is
achieved, the society will benefit from an increased level of deterrence
when it comes to the practice of bid rigging.
185. See id.
186. See id.
187. Lei No. 12.850, de 2 de Agosto de 2013, art. 4, DiARuo OFICIAL D3A UNIAO
[D.O.U.] de 05.08.2013 (Braz.).
188. See Resultados da Operapdo Lava Jato [Results of Operation Lava Jato], MPF,
http://lavajato.mpf.mp.br/atuacao-na-la-instancia/resultados/a-lava-jato-em-
numeros1 (last visited Nov. 17, 2016).
189. See Cartel Settlements, INT'L COMPETITION NETWORK (Apr. 2008), available at
http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/ibrary/doc347.pdf
190. See Resultados da Operapdo Lava Jato, supra note 188.
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Antitrust, Anti-Corruption, and Criminal Leniency Regimes [Table 2]
Law 12,529 of 2011191 1 Law 12,846 of 2013192 [ Law 12,850 of 2013193
Article 86. CADE, by





action of the public
administration or reduce
one (1) to two-thirds (2/3)
of the applicable penalty,
under the terms of this
article, with individuals or
legal entities that cause
violations of the economic





cooperation, including: 1 9 4
I - the identification of
other persons involved in
the violation; and
Article 16. The maximum
authority of each agency
or public entity may enter
into leniency agreements
with the legal entities held
accountable under this Act
that effectively cooperate
with the investigations and
the administrative
proceeding, and such
cooperation results in:20 8
Section 10 The General
Controller of the Federal
Union (Controladoria-
Geral da Unido - CGU) is
the agency empowered to
enter into leniency
agreements in the Federal
Executive Power sphere, as
well as in the case of
harmful acts against a
foreign public
administration. 2 0 9
Article 16 ( ... ):
I - the identification of
others involved in the
infraction, should that be
the case; and
Article 4. Upon request of
the parties, the judge can
grant the pardon, or
reduce the penalty of
imprisonment in up to 2/3
(two-thirds), or replace it
for one merely restricting
other rights, if the
applicant assists the
authorities effectively and
voluntarily in the scope of
the investigation and of
the criminal proceeding,
provided that such
assistance leads to one or
more of the following
results:22 2
Section 2 Considering the
relevance of the
collaboration, the Public
Prosecution Office, at any
time, and the Police Chief
Investigator, in the files of
the police investigation
with the opinion of the
Public Prosecution Office,
may request that the judge
grants the pardon to the
applicant, even if such
benefit has not been
negotiated in the initial
proposal (. . .)223
Article 4 ( ... ):
I - the identification of the
other co-authors and
participants of the criminal
organization and of the
criminal infringements
undertaken by them; 2 2 4
191. Lei No. 12.529, de 30 de Novembro de 2011, DiAio OFICIAL DA UNIAO [D.O.U.]
de 01.12.2011 (Braz.).
192. Lei No. 12.846, de 1 de Agosto de 2013, DIARIO OFICIAL DA UNIAO [D.O.U.] de
02.08.2013 (Braz.).
193. Lei No. 12.850, de 2 de Agosto de 2013, DIARIO OFICIAL DA UNIAO [D.O.U.] de
05.08.2013 (Braz.).
194. Lei No. 12.529, de 30 de Novembro de 2011, art. 86, DIARo OFICIAL DA UNIAO
[D.O.U.] de 01.12.2011 (Braz.).
195. Lei No. 12.529, de 30 de Novembro de 2011, art. 86, DIARIO OFICIAL DA UNIAO
[D.O.U.] de 01.1.2.2011 (Braz.).
196. Id. at art. 86 § 1.
197. Id.
198. Lei No. 12.529, de 30 de Novembro de 2011, art. 86(I), DIARIO OFICIAL DA
UNIAO [D.O.U.] de 01.12.2011 (Braz.).
199. Id. at art. 86(IV).
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violation. 1 9 5
Section 1 The agreement
referred to in the caput of
this article may only be
executed if the following
requirements are
cumulatively fulfilled: 19 6
[identical provision has
been in force upon the
former Antitrust Law]
I - the company is the first
to be qualified in relation
to the reported or
investigated violation;197




violation, as of the date
the agreement is
proposed;198
III - the General
Superintendence does not
have sufficient evidence to
guarantee the conviction of
the company or individual
at the time the agreement
is proposed; and
II - the prompt gathering
of information and
documents proving the tort
under investigation. 2 1 0
Section 1 The agreements
mentioned in the caput can






I - the legal entity shall be
the first one to manifest its
interest in cooperating
with the investigation of
the tort;2 1
2









Section 16 There will not
be a condemnatory
decision issued exclusively




Section 4 In the same
hypotheses of the caput,
the Public Prosecution
Office may decline to
accuse the applicant in the




I - is not the leader of the
criminal organization; 2 2 7
II - is the first to carry out
effective assistance
according to the terms of





200. Id. at art. 86(IV).
201. Lei No. 12.529, de 30 de Novembro de 2011, art. 86, DIARIO OFICIAL DA UNIAO
[D.O.U.] de 01.12.2011 (Braz.).
202. Id.
203. Lei No. 12.529, de 30 de Novembro de 2011, art. 86, DIARio OFICIAL DA UNIAO
[D.O.U.] de 01.12.2011 (Braz.).
204. Id.
205. Lei No. 12.529, de 30 de Novembro de 2011, DIARIO OFICIAL DA UNIAO [D.O.U.]
de 01.12.2011 (Braz.).
206. Id.
207. Lei No. 12.529, de 30 de Novembro de 2011, art. 87, DIARIO OFICIAL DA UNIAO
[D.O.U.] de 01.12.2011 (Braz.).
208. Lei No. 12.846, de 1 de Agosto de 2013, art. 16, DIARio OFICIAL DA UNIAO
[D.O.U.] de 02.08.2013 (Braz.).
209. Id. at art. 16 § 10.
210. Lei No. 12.846, de 1 de Agosto de 2013, art. 16(11), DIARIO OFICIAL DA UNIAO
[D.O.U.] de 02.08.2013 (Braz.).
211. Id. at art. 16 § 1.
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IV - the company
confesses to having





appearing, at its own
expense, whenever
required, at all procedural
acts, until the conclusion
thereof.' 9 9
Section 2 In relation to
individuals they may enter
into leniency agreements
provided that requirements
II, III, and IV of Section 1
hereof are complied
with.2 00
Section 3 The leniency
agreement entered into





effective cooperation and a
useful result from the
proceeding. 2 0 1
Section 4 The Tribunal





III - the legal entity
admits its involvement in





requested, at its own
expenses, in all procedural




Section 4 The leniency
agreements shall set forth
the required conditions to
ensure the effectiveness of
the cooperation and the




Section 12 Even if
benefited from pardon or
not accused in the scope of
a criminal proceeding, the
applicant may have to
provide his deposition
before the judge, upon
request of the parties or
by judicial order.2 2 9
Section 14 In his
depositions, and in the
presence of his lawyer, the
applicant will decline the
right to remain in silence
and will be subject to the
legal obligation of telling
the truth.230
[as a general rule, criminal
provisions concern only
individuals]
Article 6. The leniency
agreement will be written
and shall include: (. .)231
[The judge attests to the
legality of the leniency
agreement after its
negotiation between the
Chief of the Police (with
opinion of the Public
Prosecution Office) or the
Public Prosecution Office
and the applicant and his
lawyer - Article 4, Section
7]
212. Id. at art. 16.
213. Lei No. 12.846, de 1 de Agosto de 2013, art. 16, DIARIO OFICIAL DA UNIAO
[D.O.U.] de 02.08.2013 (Braz.).
214. Id. at art. 16(111).
215. Lei No. 12.846, de 1 de Agosto de 2013, art. 16 § 4, DIARIO OFICIAL DA UNIAO
[D.O.U.] de 02.08.2013 (Braz.).
216. Id. at art. 16 § 2.
217. Lei No. 12.846, de 1 de Agosto de 2013, art. 16, DIARIo OFICIAL DA UNIAO
[D.O.U.] de 02.08.2013 (Braz.).
218. Id. at art. 17.
219. Id. at. art. 17 § 6.
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I - terminate the punitive
action of the public
administration in favor of
the transgressor, if the
settlement proposal has
been submitted to the
General Superintendence
without prior knowledge of
the notified violation; or
II - in the other cases,
reduce the applicable
penalties from one (1) to
two-thirds (2/3), observing
what is set forth in Article
45 of this Law, also
considering the




faith in the complying with
the leniency agreement.2 0 2
Section 6 The effects of
the leniency agreement
shall be extended to
companies of the same
group, de facto or de jure,
and to their directors,
administrators, or
employees involved in the
violation, provided they
enter into it jointly,
respecting the imposed
conditions.2 0 3
Section 7 The company or




qualification to enter into
the agreement referred to
in this article may, with
the General
Superintendence, enter
into a leniency agreement
related to another
violation of which Cade
does not have prior
knowledge, until the case
is submitted to trial.
[no corresponding
provision]
Section 2 The execution of
the leniency agreement
shall exempt the legal
entity from the sanctions
set forth in Item II of
Article 6 and in Section IV
of Article 19 hereof and
shall reduce by 2/3 (two-
thirds) the value of the
applicable penalty fine.216
Section 5 The effects of
the leniency agreement
shall be extended to the
legal entities of the same
economic group, in fact
and in law, subject to such
legal entities also signing
the agreement, becoming
bound by the conditions
set forth therein. 2 1 7
Article 17. The public
administration may also
enter into leniency
agreement with the legal
entity responsible for the
practice of torts described
in Law 8,666 of 1993, with
a view to exemption or
mitigation of
administrative sanctions set
forth in Articles 86 and 88
thereof.2 18
[pardon - Article 4, caput]
[reduction in the penalty
of imprisonment in up to






220. Id. at. art. 17 § 7.
221. Id. at. art. 17 § 3.
222. Lei No. 12.850, de 2 de Agosto de 2013, art. 4, DiARio OFICIAL DA UNIAO
[D.O.U.] de 05.08.2013 (Braz.).
223. Id. at art. 4 § 2.
224. Id. at art. 4(I).
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Section 8 Under the terms
of Section 7 of this article,
the transgressor shall
benefit from a reduction of
one-third (1/3) of the
penalty applicable to him
in that case, without
prejudice to obtaining the
benefits mentioned in Item
I of Section 4 of this
article for a new reported
violation. 204
Section 9 The agreement
proposal referred to in this
article is considered





Section 10 The rejection of
the proposed leniency
agreement, of which no
disclosure shall be made,
shall not be considered a
confession as to the facts
or recognition of the
wrongfulness of the
conduct under analysis.206
Article 87. For crimes
against the economic
order, as defined by Law
8,137 of 1990, and other
crimes directly related to
cartel conduct, such as
defined by Law 8,666 of
1993, and the ones defined
in article 288 of Decree-
Law 2,848 of 1940 - Penal
Code, the execution of a
leniency agreement under
this law requires the




only become public after
the execution of such





of a proposal regarding
execution of a leniency
agreement shall not be
construed as recognition of
the practice of the
investigated tort.2 2 0
Section 3 A leniency
agreement does not relieve
the legal entity from the
obligation to fully repair
the damages caused.221
Article 7.
Section 3 The leniency
agreement is no longer
confidential as soon as the
judge decides to launch the
criminal proceeding upon
request of the Public
Prosecution Office, still
applying the provisions of
Article 5.232
Section 10 If parties
withdraw the proposal, the
self-incriminatory evidence
brought by the applicant
will not be exclusively used
against him.2 3 3
Article 4. (. . .) [demanded
results]:
IV - full or partial
recovery of the product or
advantage sought through
the criminal infringements
practiced by the criminal
organization. 2 3 4
Lei No. 12.850, de 2 de Agosto de 2013, art. 4 § 16, DiARIO OFICIAL DA UNIAO
[D.O.U.] de 05.08.2013 (Braz.).
Id. at art. 4 § 4.
Id. at art. 4(I).
Id. at art. 4(11).
Lei No. 12.850, de 2 de Agosto de 2013, art. 4 § 12., DIARIo OFICIAL DA UNIAO
[D.O.U.] de 05.08.2013 (Braz.).
Id. at art. 4 § 14.
Lei No. 12.850, de 2 de Agosto de 2013, art. 6(I)-(V). DIARIO OFICIAL DA UNIAO
[D.O.U.] de 05.08.2013 (Braz.).
Lei No. 12.850, de 2 de Agosto de 2013, art. 7 § 5. DIARIO OFICIAL DA UNIAO
[D.O.U.] de 05.08.2013 (Braz.).
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of limitations and prevents
denunciation from being
offered in relation to the
leniency beneficiary.
Sole paragraph. Once the
leniency agreement has
been complied with by the
agent, the punishments for
the crimes set forth in the
caput of this article shall
automatically cease. 2 0 7
Having related the administrative antitrust and anti-corruption with
the criminal provisions, it is now useful to identify their similarities, and
more importantly, to focus on the main challenges caused by inconsisten-
cies amongst the provisions.
D. AUTHORITIES WITH POWER TO EXECUTE THE LENIENCY
AGREEMENTS: CHINESE WALLS AND INDEPENDENCE
1. SG and CADE
Article 86; Article 16, Section 10; and Article 4, Section 2, respectively,
of the Antitrust, Anti-Corruption, and Criminal Organization Laws grant
the authorities the power of executing the leniency agreements. 235
As already discussed, in antitrust cases, the investigative branch of
CADE is the controlling authority.236 The President of CADE has al-
ways emphasized that the Tribunal (where CADE's President holds a
seat) and the SG are separate independent bodies within CADE.2 37 The
President of CADE's Tribunal and the SG are independently appointed
to their terms by the President of the Republic, and both names have to
be approved by the Senate. 2 3 8
a. Chinese Wall and Independence
The separation of the investigative and the decision-making bodies is
important, and can be likened to creating a Chinese Wall in the scope of
the negotiation of leniency agreements. The leniency applicant must be
sure that the information being exposed to the authorities during the ne-
234. Id. at art. 4.
235. See Lei No. 12.529, de 30 de Novembro de 2011, art. 86, DIARIO OFICIAL DA
UNIAO [D.O.U.] de 01.12.2011 (Braz.); see Lei No. 12.846, de 1 de Agosto de 2013,
art 16 §10, DIARIo OFICIAL D3A UNIAO [D.O.U.] de 02.08.2013 (Braz.); see Lei No.
12.850, de 2 de Agosto de 2013, art. 4 § 2, DIARIo OFICIAL DA UNIAO [D.O.U.] de
05.08.2013 (Braz.).12.846, de 1 de Agosto de 2013, DIARIO OFICIAL DA UNIAO
[D.O.U.] de 02.08.2013 (Braz.); see Lei No. 12.850, de 2 de Agosto de 2013, art. 4§ 2, DIARIO OFICIAL DA UNIAO [D.O.U.] de 05.08.2013 (Braz.).
236. Calliari & Guimaraes, supra note 26, at 68.
237. See Our History, CADE (Mar. 23, 2016), http://en.cade.gov.br/topics/about-us/our-
history
238. See Competition Law and Policy in Brazil, OECD (2010), available at https://www
.oecd.org/daf/competition/45154362.pdf.
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gotiation process will not be in any way shared with the decision-makers
(CADE's Commissioners) in case the applicant and the SG do not reach
an agreement. The possibility that an agreement will not be reached is
the underlying rationale of the other provisions pointed out in the chart
above: Article 86, section 10; Article 16, section 7; and Article 4, section
10 of the Antitrust, Anti-Corruption, and Criminal Organization Laws,
respectively. If the laws provided differently, they would not ensure a
good incentive for the negotiation of the agreements because potential
applicants would fear the possibility that the authorities would end up
using evidence brought by the applicants without granting them any cor-
responding benefits.
2. CG U
According to Article 16 caput of the Anti-Corruption Law, the respon-
sibility for the execution of leniency agreements is the maximum author-
ity of each agency or public entity, and this concerns any entity belonging
to the Legislative, Executive, or Judiciary branches at either federal,
state, or local levels.2 3 9 Law Number 12,846 of 2013 has a national reach,
as the law is applicable to the three levels of the Brazilian federation. 2 4 0
Thus, at state and local levels, it would not be possible to draw a parallel
between the three leniency regimes.
Notably, Article 16, section 10 of the Anti-Corruption Law establishes
that, at the federal level, CGU is the only body with the power to execute
administrative anti-corruption leniency agreements. 2 4 1 CGU is also the
only body with the power to execute the agreements concerning practices
that may have harmed a foreign public administration.2 4 2
Unlike the Antitrust Law, the Anti-Corruption Law does not differen-
tiate investigative and decision-making bodies in the context of negotia-
tions of leniency agreements. 2 4 3 Provisions related to the investigation
were only mentioned in the Regulating Presidential Decree 8,420 of 2015
and the CGU Ordinance Number 910, of April 7, 2015.244 The CGU
Ordinance states that the CGU Executive-Secretary appoints a commis-
239. Lei No. 12.846, de 1 de Agosto de 2013, art. 16 § 10, DIARIO OFICIAL DA UNIAO
[D.O.U.] de 02.08.2013 (Braz.).
240. See Lei No. 12.846, de 1 de Agosto de 2013, DIARIO OFICIAL DA UNIAO [D.O.U.]
de 02.08.2013 (Braz.).
241. Lei No.12.846, de 1 de Agosto de 2013, art. 16 § 10, DIARio OFICIAL DA UNIAO
[D.O.U.] de 02.08.2013 (Braz.).
242. Id.
243. See id. at art. 16.
244. Regarding the federal administrative regulation of Law No. 12.846 of 2013, see
Decreto No. 8.420, de 18 de Margo de 2015, DIARIO OFICIAL DA UNIAO [D.O.U.]
de 19.03.2015 (Braz.); see also Instrucao Normativa No. 2, de 7 de Abril de 2015,
DIARIO OFICIAL DA UNIAo [D.O.U.] de 8.04.2015 (Braz.) (discussing national re-
gistries of uncompliant and suspended companies (CEIS) and penalized compa-
nies (CNEP)); see also Instrucio Normativa No. 1, de 7 de Abril de 2015, DiAiio
OFICLAL DA UNIAO [D.O.U.] de 13.4.2015 (Braz.) (discussing concepts of gross
sales and taxes).
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sion with the aim to carry out the investigations. 245
a. Chinese Wall and Independence
Notably, such institutional difference, at least theoretically, is not re-
lated to the demand of the existence of a Chinese Wall between investiga-
tive and decision making bodies. Similar to the Antitrust Law, Article 16,
section 7 of the Anti-Corruption Law demands that if the parties (author-
ity and applicant) fail to reach an agreement, evidence brought by the
applicant to the authority in the negotiation process cannot be used by
the latter to make a regular case (without leniency) against the former
applicant. 2 4 6
3. Public Prosecution Office and Police
In the criminal leniency regime (Article 4, section 2), the applicant can
negotiate an agreement with the Public Prosecution Office or with a Po-
lice Chief Investigator, depending on the case. 2 4 7
The Police conduct criminal investigations and send their reports to a
Public Prosecution Office, which can then recommend that a judge
should open a criminal proceeding that may result in a conviction. Public
Prosecution Offices, can also conduct their own investigations.
When a leniency agreement is negotiated between an applicant and a
Police Chief Investigator, a Public Prosecution Office will always have the
obligation to issue an opinion about the agreement.
a. Chinese Wall and Independence
The demand of a Chinese Wall between the Police Chief Investigator
or Public Prosecution Office and a judge, as already mentioned, is stated
in Article 4, section 10 of the Criminal Organization Law,2 4 8 and has the
same rationale as the corresponding provisions in the Antitrust and Anti-
Corruption laws. It should be noted that the Police and the Public Prose-
cution Offices have different structures than CADE and CGU.
The Police and the Public Prosecution Offices are giant structures re-
sponsible for investigating and prosecuting any criminal offense through-
out the whole country, and not just antitrust and anti-corruption
crimes.2 4 9 Police Chief Investigators and Public Prosecutors are not ap-
pointed or approved by Executive and Legislative political authorities.
Yet, the power to execute criminal leniency agreements is not only in the
245. See Instrucdo Normativa No. 2, de 7 de Abril de 2015, DIAIo OFICIAL DA UNIAO
[D.O.U.] de 8.04.2015 (Braz.) (discussing national registries of uncompliant and
suspended companies (CEIS) and penalized companies (CNEP)).
246. See Lei No. 12.846, de 1 de Agosto de 2013, art. 16 § 7, DIARIo OFICIAL DA UNIAO
[D.O.U.] de 02.08.2013 (Braz.).
247. See Lei No. 12.850, de 2 de Agosto de 2013, art. 4 § 2, DIARIO OFICIAL DA UNIAO
[D.O.U.] de 05.08.2013 (Braz.).
248. See id. at art. 4 § 10.
249. See Lei No. 12.850, de 2 de Agosto de 2013, art. 4, Diirio Oficial da Uniso
[D.O.U.] de 05.08.2013 (Braz.).
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hands of the General Director of the Federal Police or of the Attorney
General of the Public Prosecution Office (their maximum authorities),
but entry-level Police Chief Investigators or Public Prosecutors can also
work on negotiations and execute leniency agreements. 2 5 0
This means that the level of decentralization of the decision power is
much greater in the criminal leniency agreements than in the antitrust
and anti-corruption contexts. As already mentioned in section 3, this fea-
ture implies both advantages and disadvantages. Although the level of
independence from the political power is much better, when it comes to
antitrust and anti-corruption criminal offenses, it is not easy to coordinate
all the work that needs to be developed by the Police and the Public Pros-
ecution Office with the work carried out by specialized bodies like
CADE and CGU. This is especially true in respect to the coordination of
antitrust, anti-corruption, and criminal leniency agreements.
E. APPLICANTS AND BENEFITS OF THE LENIENCY AGREEMENTS
Article 86 of the Antitrust Law regulates both legal entities and indi-
viduals; meanwhile, Article 16 of the Anti-Corruption Law only regulates
legal entities.25 1 The provisions that follow address what the laws state
with respect to liability, infringements, and penalties.
Similarly, Article 86, section 6 and Article 16, section 5 establish that
antitrust and anti-corruption leniency agreements executed by a legal en-
tity also benefit all other entities belonging to the same group, provided
that the other entities also sign the agreement. 2 5 2 This concept reflects an
economic rationale intended to punish or benefit the ones responsible for
the practices, and not a formalistic standard designed to focus on a partic-
ular legal entity. But while the Antitrust Law extends the benefits to
directors, administrators and employees of a legal entity, the Anti-Cor-
ruption Law does not have the same benefits because its intent is to im-
pose liability only on legal entities.
As a general rule, criminal law only applies to individuals, so naturally
they are the only ones entitled to execute leniency agreements with the
criminal authorities.
Article 86 of the Antitrust Law and Article 4 of the Criminal Organiza-
tion Law set the benefits that may be reached by the leniency appli-
cants. 253 Article 86 states benefits ranging from full immunity (full
leniency) to a fine reduction between one-third and two-thirds of the fine
250. See id.
251. Lei No. 12.529, de 30 de Novembro de 2011, art. 86, DIAnIo OFICIAL DA UNIAO
[D.O.U.] de 01.12.2011 (Braz.); Lei No. 12.846, de I de Agosto de 2013, art. 16,
DIARIO OFICIAL DA UNIAO [D.O.U.] de 02.08.2013 (Braz.).
252. See Lei No. 12.529, de 30 de Novembro de 2011, art. 86 § 6, DIARIo OFICIAL DA
UNIAO [D.O.U.] de 01.12.2011 (Braz.); see Lei No. 12.846, de 1 de Agosto de 2013,
art. 16, §5 DIARIO OFICIAL DA UNIAO [D.O.U.] de 02.08.2013 (Braz.).
253. See Lei No. 12.529, de 30 de Novembro de 2011, art. 86, DIARIO OFICIAL IDA
UNIAo [D.O.U.] de 01.12.2011 (Braz.); see Lei No. 12.850, de 2 de Agosto de 2013,
art. 4, DIARIO OFICIAL DA UNIAO [D.O.U.] de 05.08.2013 (Braz.).
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that could be applied in the absence of the agreement (partial leni-
ency).254 A full leniency may be granted when the applicant reports to
the authority the existence of a totally new violation, which was not being
previously investigated in any way. The partial leniency applies when the
applicant aggregates his report with an existing investigation being car-
ried out by the authority.
Similarly, in the scope of the Criminal Organization Law, the agree-
ment can grant to the applicant either a pardon, a reduction in the pen-
alty of imprisonment of up to two thirds, or the substitution of the
penalty of imprisonment for one merely restricting other rights of the
applicant.2 5 5
The benefits granted by the anti-corruption leniency agreement are
stated in Article 16, section 2.256 Unlike the antitrust and criminal leni-
ency agreements, there is no possibility of full immunity. 257 The fine re-
duction can reach two-thirds of the applicable fine, regardless of the
previous existence of an investigation being carried out by the authority
on the reported practice. 2 5 8
Another benefit of leniency agreements is the legal provisions dealing
with confidentiality. Article 86, section 9 of the Antitrust Law grants
confidentiality to the leniency applicant for a period of time longer than
both the one assured by Article 16, Section 6 of the Anti-Corruption Law
and Article 7, Section 3 of the Criminal Organization Law.2 5 9 The Anti-
trust Law, if considered jointly with Article 207 of CADE's Internal Reg-
ulation, allows the identity of the applicant to remain confidential until
the CADE Tribunal reaches a final decision on the case. The Anti-Cor-
ruption and the Criminal Organization laws, respectively, assure confi-
dentiality until (i) the execution of the agreement, and (ii) the launching
of a. criminal proceeding upon request of the Public Prosecution
Office. 260
Notably, there is a disclaimer in both the Antitrust and Anti-Corrup-
tion laws stating that confidentiality is assured "except in the interest of
the investigations and the administrative proceeding." 2 6 1 In the two anti-
trust leniency agreements executed in connection with Operation Car
Wash, not only has the identity of the applicants been put in the public
254. See Lei No. 12.529, de 30 de Novembro de 2011, art. 86, DIARo O1ICIAL DA
UNIAo [D.O.U.] de 01.12.2011 (Braz.).
255. See Lei No. 12.850, de 2 de Agosto de 2013, art. 4, DIARIO OFICIAL DA UNIAO
[D.O.U.] de 05.08.2013 (Braz.).
256. Lei No. 12.846, de 1 de Agosto de 2013, art. 16 § 2, DIARIo OFICIAL DA UNIAO
[D.O.U.] de 02.08.2013 (Braz.).
257. See id.
258. See id.
259. See Lei No. 12.529, de 30 de Novembro de 2011, art. 86 § 9, DiAuo OFICIAL DA
UNIAO [D.O.U.] de 01.12.2011 (Braz.); see Lei No. 12.850, de 2 de Agosto de 2013,
art. 7 § 3, DiAuo OFICIAL DA UNIAO [D.O.U.] de 05.08.2013 (Braz.).
260. See Lei No. 12.529, de 30 de Novembro de 2011, art. 86 § 9, DiAiio OFICIAL DA
UNIAo [D.O.U.] de 01.12.2011 (Braz.); see also Lei No. 12.850, de 2 de Agosto de
2013, art. 7 § 3, DIARIO OFICIAL DA UNIAO [D.O.U.] de 05.08.2013 (Braz.).
261. See id.
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domain, but also the content of public versions of the history of
conduct. 262
F. LENIENCY AGREEMENT REQUIREMENTS
Articles 86(I), 16(I), and 4(I) of the Antitrust, Anti-Corruption, and
Criminal Organization laws, respectively, demand that the leniency appli-
cants identify other persons or entities involved in the practices. 263
Article 86(11) of the Antitrust Law and Article 16(11) of the Anti-Cor-
ruption Law require that the applicants provide to the authorities infor-
mation and documents capable of proving the infringement.264 Similarly,
Article 4, section 16 of the Criminal Organization Law states that a con-
demnatory decision cannot be solely based on the assertions made in the
deposition of the applicant.2 65
Notably, Article 4, section 4 of the Criminal Organization Law states
that the leniency applicant cannot be the leader of the criminal organiza-
tion.2 6 6 There is no equivalent provision in the Antitrust and Anti-Cor-
ruption laws. But the former Antitrust Law that was enforced until May
2012 contained the same provision. 267 During the legislative process to
reform the Antitrust Law, there were debates on whether the provision
should be incorporated in the law. An argument in favor of the provi-
sion's revocation was that, in practice, it is very difficult to identify the
actual leader of a cartel organization, and this is the argument that pre-
vailed. Thus, Law Number 12,529 of 2011 removed the prohibition that a
potential cartel leader cannot apply for a leniency agreement. 268 Some
practitioners understand that this is one of the main changes made in the
leniency program by the new law.2 6 9
262. See CADE Signs Leniency Agreement in the Scope of "Operation Car Wash",
CADE (Mar. 20, 2015, 10:00 AM), http://en.cade.gov.br/press-releases/cade-signs-
leniency-agreement-in-the-scope-of-201coperation-car-wash2Old; see also CADE
Signs Leniency Agreement in Cartel in Public Bidding of Angra 3 Nuclear Power
Plant, CADE (July 31, 2015, 9:00 AM), http://en.cade.gov.br/press-releases/cade-
signs-leniency-agreement-in-cartel-in-public-bidding-of-angra-3-n uclear-power-
plant.
263. See Lei No. 12.529, de 30 de Novembro de 2011, art. 86(1), DIARIO OFICIAL DA
UNIAO [D.O.U.] de 01.12.2011 (Braz.); see Lei No. 12.846, de 1 de Agosto de 2013,
art. 16(I), DIARIO OFICIAL DA UNIAO [D.O.U.] de 02.08.2013 (Braz.); see Lei No.
12.850, de 2 de Agosto de 2013, art. 4(I), DiARio OFICIAL DA UNIAO [D.O.U.] de
05.08.2013 (Braz.).
264. See Lei No. 12.529, de 30 de Novembro de 2011, art. 86(11), DIARIO OFICIAL DA
UNIAo [D.O.U.] de 01.12.2011 (Braz.); see Lei No. 12.846, de 1 de Agosto de 2013,
art. 16(11), DIARIo OFICIAL DA UNIAO [D.O.U.] de 02.08.2013 (Braz.).
265. Lei No. 12.850, de 2 de Agosto de 2013, art. 4 § 6, DIARIO OrICIAL DA UNIAO
[D.O.U.] de 05.08.2013 (Braz.).
266. See id. art. 4 § 4.
267. Lei No. 8.884, de 11 de Junho de 1994, art. 35 § 1, DIARIO OFICIAL DA UNIAO
[D.O.U.] de 13.6.1990 (Braz.).
268. See Lei No. 12.529, de 30 de Novembro de 2011, DIARIO OFICIAL D)A UNIAO
[D.O.U.] de 01.12.2011 (Braz.).
269. Marcelo Calliari, Daniel Andreoli & Marcio Bueno, Chapter XII: Leniency Agree-
ments in Brazil, in OVERVIEW OF COMPETITION LAW IN BRAZIL 315, 317 (Cris-
tianne Zarzur, Krisztian Katona & Mariana Villela eds., 2015), available at http://
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Article 86, section 1(II) of the Antitrust Law and Article 16, section
1(II) of the Anti-Corruption Law explicitly demand that the applicant
must completely cease his participation in the reported violation.270
Article 86, section 1(III) of the Antitrust Law explicitly requires that
the SG cannot have sufficient evidence to guarantee a conviction in the
event that it decides to execute a leniency agreement. 2 7 1 This means that
leniency should not be understood as an instrument to reduce a possible
burden on the offenders, but rather as a tool designed to create an envi-
ronment of instability among the violators, creating an incentive in the
sense that the offenders will benefit by reporting the violation. In other
words, the SG goal should be to obtain enough evidence to convict the
other parties involved in the infringement.
Article 86, section 1(IV) of the Antitrust Law; Article 16, section 1(III)
of the Anti-Corruption Law; and Articles 4, 12, and 14 of the Criminal
Organization Law have similar provisions that require the applicant to
continuously and effectively cooperate with the authorities until the end
of the proceedings. 272
Article 86, section 3 of the Antitrust Law; Article 16, section 4 of the
Anti-Corruption Law; and Article 6 of the Criminal Organization Law
establish that the leniency agreements have to be made in writing and
contain detailed provisions about the cooperation and its results.27 3
1. The "First in" Requirement
Article 86, section 1(I) of the Antitrust Law and Article 16, section 1(I)
of the Anti-Corruption Law require the applicant to be the first one to
report the violation (first in requirement). 2 7 4 This should mean that only
one leniency filing is available. In antitrust cases, only one leniency filing
is available and it can be either full or partial, while in anti-corruption
cases there could be only one leniency undertaking of the type available
and although full immunity does not exist, the fine reduction can reach up
to two-thirds. 275
Article 4, section 4 (II) of the Criminal Organization Law states that
the Public Prosecution Office can only decline to criminally prosecute the
leniency applicant if the applicant was the first one to apply for
www.levysalomao.com.br/files/publicacao/anexo/20150701170804_artigo--anti-
cartel-enforcement-in-brazil--status-quo-and-trends--amp-e-mta.pdf.
270. Lei No. 12.529, de 30 de Novembro de 2011, art. 86, DIARIO OFICIAL DA UNIAO
[D.O.U.] de 01.12.2011 (Braz.).; Lei No. 12.846, de 1 de Agosto de 2013, art. 16,
DIARIO OFICIAL DA UNIAO [D.O.U.] de 02.08.2013 (Braz.).
271. Lei No. 12.529, de 30 de Novembro de 2011, art. 86, DIARIO OFICIAL DA UNIAO
[D.O.U.] de 01.12.2011 (Braz.).
272. See supra Table 2.
273. See id.
274. Lei No. 12.529, de 30 de Novembro de 2011, art. 86, DIARIO OFICIAL DA UNIAO




Notably, the benefits available to the applicant in the criminal leniency
are either a pardon, a reduction in the penalty of imprisonment of up to
two-thirds, or a substitution of the penalty of imprisonment for mere re-
strictions on other rights of the applicant.277 The best benefit available is
the pardon, which means the Public Prosecution Office declines to prose-
cute the applicant and the applicant is not punished in any way.
Thus, Article 4, section 4(11) is the greatest benefit provided by the
Criminal Organization Law (the pardon), and is only available for the
first leniency applicant. Other applicants can also reach an agreement,
but they will not get full immunity, regardless of how useful the collabo-
ration proves to be.
a. The Anti-Corruption Law First in Issue
Having clarified that multiple leniencies are available in the criminal
sphere, even though only the pardons offer absolute immunity, this paper
will now address subtle differences between the regulation of the Anti-
trust and Anti-Corruption leniencies. It was stated above that in the anti-
trust case there is only one leniency undertaking, while in the anti-
corruption case there could be only one. The reason for this difference is
not shown in the provisions of Article 86, section 1(I) and Article 16,
section 1(I) (regarding first in). Rather, it is the subtle addition of Article
16(I) of the Anti-Corruption Law ("the identification of others involved
in the infraction") in relation to Article 86(I) of the Antitrust Law ("the
identification of other [persons] involved in the violation") that highlights
the difference. 278
Such addition should only mean that while the Antitrust leniency only
applies to cartel cases, the Anti-Corruption leniency applies to any prac-
tice prohibited in Article 5 of the Law Number 12,846 of 2013.279 This
Article prohibits the practice of bid-rigging that, like any other cartel
practice, can only be carried out when a group of bidders agree to imple-
ment the illegal practice. Thus, leniency in such cases undoubtedly has
the aim of creating instability among the cartel members, so that they
have the incentive to report the violation to the authorities. 280
On the other hand, Article 5 of the Anti-Corruption Law also prohibits
other practices that, unlike with cartels, can be performed by a single
offender.28 1 Thus, if this single offender engages in executing a leniency
agreement, it would not be obliged to identify others involved in the prac-
276. Lei No. 12.850, de 2 de Agosto de 2013, art. 4, DIAIo OFICIAL DA UNIAO
[D.O.U.] de 05.08.2013 (Braz.).
277. Id.
278. Lei No. 12.529, de 30 de Novembro de 2011, art. 86 (1), DIARIO OFICIAL DA
UNIAO [D.O.U.] de 01.12.2011 (Braz.).
279. Lei No. 12.846, de 1 de Agosto de 2013, art. 5, DiAuo OFICIAL DA UNIAO




238 LAW AND BUSINESS REVIEW OF THE AMERICAS [Vol. 22
tice (Article 16(I)), for the very reason that it is the only offender. 282 This
is the explanation for the expression relating to Article 16(I): if there is
only one offender, there is no need to identify others involved in the
practice.283 Therefore, it creates a difference between the (i) anti-corrup-
tion infringement of bid-rigging (multiple offenders) and (ii) anti-corrup-
tion infringement carried out by a single offender. In both cases, Article
16, section 1(I) (first in requirement) should apply because in (i) the un-
derlying policy reason for leniency in cartel cases is to create instability,
promote a race among the cartelists, and make the first in facilitate the
prosecution of the other offenders, or, in (ii) the policy reason is to save
resources by closing the investigation as soon as possible while charging a
partial fine from the single offender,284 meaning the applicant will always
be the first in.
But in the course of the process of regulating the Law Number 12,846
of 2013 (in the context of Operation Car Wash, as already seen), an idea
came up that disregards the rationale explained above: the execution of
more than one leniency agreement in a case where there are multiple
offenders (the case of cartels, more specifically, bid rigging concerning
the Anti-Corruption Law) is possible. Thus, the Presidential Decree
8,420 of 2015 codified in Article 30(I) states that "a legal entity wishing to
enter into a leniency agreement shall be the first to express an interest in
cooperating for the determination of a specific harmful act, when this cir-
cumstance is relevant." 285 This wording opens the door for the execution
of two or more leniency agreements in the same bid-rigging case.
Notably, this scenario is consistent with the information available
about the CGU investigation regarding the scope of Operation Car Wash
(section 6.2 of this paper). Currently, there are twenty-nine companies
under investigation, and six of these companies have declared their inter-
est in executing a leniency agreement. 286
2. Requirements with Respect to Individual Applicants
Article 86, section 2 of the Antitrust Law states that the requirements
for the execution of a leniency agreement are the same for legal entities
and individuals (Article 86, section 1(II), (III) and (IV), with the excep-
tion of the first in under Article 86, section 1(I)).287 This means that,
282. Id.
283. Id. at art. 16(I).
284. See Lei No. 12.846, de 1 de Agosto de 2013, art. 16, DIARIO OFICIAL DA UNIAO
[D.O.U.] de 02.08.2013 (Braz.). It should be noted that in this case the nature of
the anti-corruption leniency agreement becomes essentially the same as the settle-
ment agreement.
285. See Decreto No. 8.420, de 18 de Margo de 2015, DIARIO OFICIAL DA UNIAO
[D.O.U.] de 19.03.2015 (Braz.).
286. "A empresa deve reparar integralmente o dano que causou", frisa ministro da
CGU, CGU.GOV.3R (Oct. 19, 2015, 12:15), http://www.cgu.gov.br/noticias/2015/10/
a-empresa-deve-reparar-integralmente-o-dano-que-causou-frisa-ministro-da-cgu.
287. Lei No. 12.529, de 30 de Novembro de 2011, art. 86 § 2, DIARo OFICIAL DA
UNIAo [D.O.U.] de 01.12.2011 (Braz.).
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according to the strict provisions of the law, the individual applicant does
not have to be the first one to apply for leniency; a second leniency (a
second individual applicant) is also admitted. 2 8 8 This is because the law
only admits two kinds of leniency: full and partial. Full leniency occurs
when the authority did not know about the violation, and the partial leni-
ency occurs when the authority was already conducting an investigation
on a same practice. When conducting an investigation in a particular
case, if the SG needs more evidence to convict the offenders, the SG
could execute only two leniencies with individual applicants: a full leni-
ency followed by a partial one. In case there is a third individual willing
to collaborate with the investigations, the next option available would be
the execution of a settlement agreement, according to Article 85 of the
Law Number 12,529 of 2011 and Articles 179-196 of CADE's Internal
Regulation.
Settlement agreements are also available for legal entities in cases
where there is a second applicant and other entities are still willing to
collaborate when a leniency agreement is no longer available (the first
applicant has already executed his full or partial leniency).
The Anti-Corruption Law does not have any provision on the first in
requirement concerning individuals because it is not intended to prose-
cute individuals, but only legal entities. The Criminal Organization Law
is only applicable to individuals. Thus, all its provisions should be under-
stood in this context.
G. LENIENCY AGREEMENTS AND THE ROLE OF
DECISION-MAKING AUTHORITIES
While CADE's SG is the body responsible for negotiating and execut-
ing leniency agreements, the Antitrust Law sets a limited role for a tribu-
nal. Under Article 86, section 4, at the end of the administrative
proceeding, the tribunal should examine whether the applicant has duly
carried out the agreement. 2 8 9 In that case, if there is no contradiction to
the tribunal's decision at the time, the Commissioners will (i) declare the
extinction of the administrative proceeding in relation to the applicant
when a full leniency has been executed (section 4(I)), or (ii) reduce the
applicable fine between one-third and two-thirds when a partial leniency
has been executed (section 4(II)).290
The role of the Judiciary in enforcing criminal leniency agreements is
similar to the one played by CADE's Tribunal in respect to the Antitrust
agreements, but there is a significant difference in terms of timing. While
CADE's Tribunal attests the applicant's compliance at the moment of its
final decision on the case, a judge has to homologate a criminal leniency
right after its execution between the applicant and the public prosecutor
or police chief investigator.
288. Id.
289. Id. at art. 86 § 4.
290. Id.
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The anti-corruption leniency differs in a significant way from the anti-
trust and criminal cases. In the antitrust and criminal cases, the decision-
making authorities, the ones that have to attest compliance with or ho-
mologate the agreement, are (i) politically independent from any other
authority (CADE's Commissioners have temporary terms and judges
hold permanent appointments) and, more specifically, (ii) do not have a
hierarchical relationship with the authorities responsible for the negotia-
tion and execution of the leniency agreements. 29 1
Such features are not available in anti-corruption cases. Although Law
Number 12,846 of 2013 did not bring any provision in this sense, its regu-
lation of Presidential Decree 8,420 of 2015 (by means of its Article 39)
and mainly the CGU Ordinance Number 910, of April 7, 2015 (Articles
28, 29(I), 30(VI), and 37) created a system in which the applicant presents
its proposal to the CGU Executive-Secretary. 292 Under this system, the
CGU Executive-Secretary appoints a negotiating commission comprised
of at least two public servants who hold permanent appointments. 293 The
Commission then returns a final report to the CGU Executive-Secretary,
and then the final decision on the leniency agreement is made by the
CGU Minister.294
As discussed in section 3 of this paper, the CGU Minister is directly
subordinate to the President of the Republic, who does not hold a term,
but rather, can be freely removed from Office by the President at any
time. This political relationship also exists inside CGU: the Minister as its
head, and the Executive-Secretary, who is directly subordinate to the
Minister, is the second highest CGU authority. The Executive Secretary
appoints and supervises (Article 29(11) of the Ordinance) the Commis-
sion.2 9 5 It is obvious that this institutional structure is inferior to the ones
concerning the antitrust and criminal leniency agreements.
291. See supra Table 2.
292. Portaria No. 910, de 7 de Abril de 2015, art. 28-30, DIARIO OFICIAL DA UNIAO
[D.O.U.] de 08.04.2015 (Braz.).
293. See id.
294. See id.
295. Portaria No. 910, de 7 de Abril de 2015, art. 29(11), DIARIO OFICIAL IDA UNIAO
[D.O.U.] de 08.04.2015 (Braz.). Going further on the regulation, Article 29 IV es-
tablishes that the CGU Executive-Secretary "shall adopt the necessary measures
for compliance with the TCU norms," See TCU Normative Instruction n. 74 (Feb.
11, 2015) https://contas.tcu.gov.br/juris/Web/Juris/ConsultarTextual2/Normativos
.faces?anoDocumento=2015&numeroDocumento=74&situacao=todasSituacoes.
The sole paragraph of Article 29, by its turn, establishes that the CGU Executive-
Secretary can request that a public servant or employee of the body or entity
harmed by the corrupt practice is appointed to be part of the Commission negoti-
ating the leniency agreement. That could be the case, for instance, of Petrobras
taking a seat in the Commission appointed to negotiate a leniency agreement with
a construction company in the scope of Operation Car Wash. There is not a simi-
lar provision in CADE's Internal Regulation concerning the antitrust leniency
agreements.
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H. LENIENCY PLUS AND BENEFITS RELATED TO REPORTING
PRACTICES ALSO PROHIBITED BY THE PUBLIC
PROCUREMENT LAW
Article 86, section 7 and 8 of the Antitrust Law regulates the leniency
plus. Leniency plus is available when an applicant does not succeed in
executing an agreement related to a given illegal practice, but does suc-
ceed in reporting another illegal practice unknown to the authority. In
this case, the benefits sought by the applicant are: (i) a one-third reduc-
tion in the fine due for the commitment of the first practice (unsuccessful
leniency application), and (ii) full immunity concerning the second prac-
tice (successful leniency application). CADE has executed the first case
of leniency plus in the context of Operation Car Wash.2 9 6
In contrast, the Anti-Corruption Law does not establish a leniency plus
and can not do it in the same way because it does not grant full immunity
for any applicant. But it is important to note that by means of its Article
17, it is also possible to execute anti-corruption leniency agreements re-
lated to practices forbidden by the Public Procurement Law (Law Num-
ber 8,666 of 1993).297 Benefits granted by such leniency can be (i)
mitigation of the penalties set by Articles 8688 of the Law Number 8,666,
or (ii) full immunity concerning the same penalties-something the Anti-
Corruption Law does not grant even for its own penalties. This is espe-
cially important because Article 87 (III) and (IV) of the Public Procure-
ment Law establish the penalties on the temporary suspension of the
right to participate in bids and prohibits contracting with the government
for a period not longer than two years, in addition to declaring one
noncompliant for participating in bids or contracting with the govern-
ment, as already discussed in section 5 of this paper.
VII. CRIMINAL IMMUNITY FOR THE INDIVIDUALS
APPLYING FOR ANTITRUST LENIENCY AND THE
LACK OF CRIMINAL PROTECTION IN THE
ANTI-CORRUPTION LAW
When it comes to Antitrust and Anti-Corruption penalties, it is normal
to immediately think about fines. Due to the prohibition of participating
in public bids, fines are usually the main concern for companies involved
in the illegal practices. In addition, it should be considered that compa-
nies are the main users of the antitrust leniency program because they
should have, and often do have, the appropriate structure and resources
to implement compliance programs with the aim of detecting possible
breaches of the law.
296. See CADE Signs Leniency Agreement in the Scope of "Operation Car Wash",
supra note 217.
297. Lei No. 12.846, de 1 de Agosto de 2013, art. 17, DIARIO OFICIAL DA UNIAO
[D.O.U.] de 02.08.2013 (Braz.).
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On the other hand, individuals can also be convicted by Antitrust prac-
tices and may execute leniency agreements, jointly with (most common)
or separately from the companies for which they work or used to work.
When executing such agreements, individuals confess their participation
in the practices and produce evidence against themselves, so their crimi-
nal immunity, granted by Article 87 of the Antitrust Law, can be under-
stood as even more important than their immunity against fines.
Consequently, the problem is the possibility of criminal immunity not
being granted under the Anti-Corruption Law context. This is one of the
biggest disincentives for the execution of anti-corruption leniency agree-
ments. The Anti-Corruption Law does not set penalties on individuals
because the law was intended to deter corrupt practices undertaken by
companies, but there is no doubt that when a company negotiates a leni-
ency agreement, it is providing authorities evidence of corrupt acts per-
formed by individuals. Thus, in case an agreement is reached, evidence
corroborating at least one individual can support a criminal prosecution.
It should be understood that this is one of the main reasons no anti-cor-
ruption leniency agreement has been executed since the law has been in
force.
The main point of contention between the Antitrust and the Anti-Cor-
ruption Laws is the lack of criminal immunity for individuals by an anti-
corruption leniency agreement. This essentially reduces the incentives for
simultaneouS 298 or consecutive executions of antitrust, anti-corruption,
and criminal leniency agreements. Importantly, there is a notable differ-
ence between Article 87 of the Antitrust; Article 16, section 3 of the Anti-
Corruption; and Article 4 of the Criminal Organization Law.
Article 87 of the Antitrust Law states that leniency may assure criminal
immunity for cartel practices defined by the Economic Crimes Law (Law
Number 8,137 of 1990), and other cartel related practices, such as the
ones defined by the Public Procurement Law (Law Number 8,666 of
1993) and the Criminal Code (Decreto-Lei 2,848 of 1940).299 This should
be understood as meaning that the execution of a leniency agreement
with CADE should (i) not only criminally immunize the applicant against
the penalties established by the Economic Crimes Law, the Public Pro-
curement Law, and the Criminal Code, but also (ii) criminally immunize
298. Practitioners have been questioning the antitrust, anti-corruption and criminal au-
thorities about the possibility of a single leniency application before such authori-
ties, so that their clients could be able to rapidly and certainly gather antitrust,
anti-corruption and criminal leniency benefits, while the authorities could also rap-
idly and certainly strengthen their cases against the other defendants. The authori-
ties admit having engaged in a dialogue for such purpose, but until now such
possibility is not real (IBRAC, 2015a). This means that lawyers have to set their
particular defense strategies on a case by case basis, that is, in a given case it might
be better to go first to the antitrust, or the anti-corruption, or even to the criminal
authorities, depending on which authority supposedly is conducting the more ad-
vanced investigation or can offer the more important benefits to the applicants (for
instance: fine immunity, criminal immunity, etc.).
299. Lei No. 12.529, de 30 de Novembro de 2011, art. 87, DIARIO OFICIAL DA UNIAO
[D.O.U.] de 01.12.2011 (Braz.).
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the applicant against any other criminal infringement related to the cartel
practice reported in such leniency agreement. 300
But, according to Martinez and Araujo, "[a]lthough the law generally
refers to 'crimes directly related to the cartel activity, such as the ones listed
in Law 8,666/93 and Article 288 of Brazil's Civil Code', some prosecutors
have already stated that a leniency letter signed with CADE may only
protect leniency recipients from criminal conviction regarding the of-
fenses explicitly mentioned by the law." 30 1 It should be noted that leni-
ency criminal immunity is only possible because the Public Prosecution
Office executes the agreements jointly with CADE, as prosecutors are
the only authorities with the power to request judges to open criminal
proceedings. 302
As already seen, the Anti-Corruption Law does not grant the possibil-
ity of criminal immunity. Article 16, section 3 (Anti-Corruption) explic-
itly states that the anti-corruption leniency does not eliminate the
obligation of the applicant to fully repair the damages caused by the prac-
tice. The Antitrust Law does not include such a provision, but even so it
is certain that leniency does not offer benefits related to the reparation of
damages. Thus, antitrust civil liability remains even in the presence of a
leniency agreement.
Article 4(IV) of the Criminal Organization Law incorporates a provi-
sion related to Article 16, section 3 of the Anti-Corruption Law: one of
the alternative results that has to be sought by the authorities through
leniency applicants' cooperation is the full or partial recovery of the prod-
300. See id. The rationale behind the "such as" provision is to ensure the greatest crim-
inal protection to the applicant, and thus to provide a powerful incentive for the
execution of an antitrust leniency agreement.
301. Ana Paula Martinez & Mariana Tavares de Araujo, Chapter IX: Anti-Cartel En-
forcement in Brazil: Status Quo & Trends, in OVERVIEW OF COMPETITION LAW IN
BRAZIL 257, 272 (Cristianne Zarzur, Krisztian Katona & Mariana Villela eds.,
2015), available at http://www.levysalomao.com.br/files/publicacao/anexo/20150701
170804_artigo--anti-cartel-enforcement-in-brazil-status-quo-and-trends--amp
-e-mta.pdf.
302. See id.; A bill proposing changes to the anti-corruption law (PLS 105 of 2015) has
been presented by the Senator who reported the bill that ended becoming the Law
12,846 of 2013. After being analyzed and modified by the Senate, PLS 105 of 2015
was sent to the analysis of the House of Representatives on November 16, 2015.
This bill is still under debate in the House of Representatives, where it is identified
as PL 3636 of 2015. See Projectos de Lei e Outra Proposipdes: PL 3636/205,
CAMARA Dos DEPUTADOS, http://www.camara.gov.br/proposicoesWeb/fichade-
tramitacao?idProposicao=2055350 (last visited on Nov. 20, 2016). It is not possible
to state that this bill will be approved and change the current anti-corruption law.
Nevertheless, the following changes being proposed are worth to mention: i) the
creation of an anti-corruption full leniency, and; ii) criminal immunity for individu-
als executing anti-corruption leniency agreements, provided that the Public Prose-
cution Office agrees with this benefit on a case by case basis. A final relevant note:
in December 2015, the Presidency of the Republic issued the polemical Provisional
Measure 703 of 2015, with the aim of accelerating several changes seen as impor-
tant by the Federal Administration, but in May 2016 such Provisional Measure was
rejected by the Congress, since its mandatory confirmation by the Legislative
Branch did not take place.
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uct or advantage obtained by means of the practices carried out by the
criminal organization.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The analysis provided in this paper is in no way exhaustive. Rather, the
conclusion only aims to reinforce the importance of having the antitrust,
anti-corruption, and criminal authorities working together to reach the
best practices for optimum enforcement of the three leniency regimes.
Notably, such authorities are already working together. The practitioners
and their significant expertise represent a great contribution to this pro-
cess. Congress can also perform a decisive role in solving this complex
issue by requiring a balance between the incentives for the execution of
the three kinds of leniency agreements. This can result in a possible con-
struction of best practices and effective enforcement of the laws.
Finally, in spite of all the technicalities involved in this issue, it is im-
portant that civil society finds a way to keep tight surveillance over this
matter. Although several obstacles still prevent the effective enforce-
ment of the three leniency regimes, there remains great opportunity to
improve the legal tools in the context of a political crisis.
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